Introduction
Our objective in this chapter is to address a fundamental human problem from a Barthian perspective. Why are so many people poor, and what can governments or nations do to relieve their sufferings? We wish to address this question, and specifically, we wish to concern ourselves with a specific instance of economic deprivation as occurring in the world today.
How can we address this issue? Our fundamental thesis is that economic life has its basis in social history (2.3). The social history by which we interpret a given economic circumstance is the history of the covenant as the inner sphere, surrounded by the general history that relates to that given economic circumstance, (4.3) and (4.9). Once we have chosen a given economic situation, we must relate the general history pertaining to that economic situation to the history of the covenant as we have discerned it in Barth. Or, if we wish to hear a Word of grace pertinent to a specific instance of economic suffering, that Word is always historically concrete, and its revelatory knowledge always includes a knowledge of that economic circumstance as gained through observation and reflection (2.17).(1) Therefore, our next step is to specify the economic condition we wish to address, and describe how we shall relate the general history and data pertinent to its existence to the history of the covenant and the theological knowledge given to us in faith.
We shall investigate the economic plight of what is commonly called the Third World, specifically Latin America and Chile, and they in relation to the wealthy industrialized countries of the West, especially the United States. In order to analyze this economic circumstance, we must present a social historical analysis of this given economic situation in relation to our results as derived from Barth. We have chosen to use a Marxist account for the general history and empirical data which will be related to the covenant and its theological content.(2) We have chosen a Marxist account for a number of reasons, but one factor in particular makes it a compelling choice. We located economic life in a social historical context (2.3), and therefore we need a social historical analysis of economic life. Contemporary Marxist economists, in contrast to non-Marxists economists, emphasize the historical and social context of economic affairs and therefore we may make use of their studies. Furthermore, although we cannot accept aspects of their view of history, we shall show that central Marxist concepts can be interpreted and related to our Barthian categories and conclusions, and further, that their historical data interpreted through these concepts is congruent with our Barthian perspective.(3) Consequently, our approach will be to demonstrate a congruence between certain Marxist and Barthian categories. Then we shall present the data and social history pertinent to our chosen economic situation in Marxist terms, and summarize its chief points through a use of Barthian categories. In this way, we shall understand an aspect of contemporary social history in terms of covenant by interpreting historical data through the use of Marxist concepts as explicated by Barthian categories. Our next step is to describe the Marxist concepts that we shall employ, and their relation to our theological categories and results. Before we do this, however, we wish to pause briefly to indicate the nature of the conclusions we shall derive from this historical investigation.
We shall address the issue of why certain peoples are poor and how nations may act responsibly to relieve their suffering. Nations and classes belong to the outer sphere of general history, (4.3) and (4.9). They are ruled by ideologies, and subject to confusion, chaos, and sin (4.8). Furthermore, by (2.7), poverty and economic misery are the result of sin, sin understood as broken social relations between classes, nations, and persons. Therefore, we will need to describe historically events of social encounter between peoples, and show how these interactions have created economic deprivation. Since nations and classes belong to the outer sinful sphere of the nations, and since we shall focus on their sinful behavior as its creates economic suffering, our social historical analysis will lay bare the nature of sin as the social basis of economic misery. By (3.4) and (3.5) we would expect this sin to take certain forms. It manifests itself as the desire to accumulate, the lust for bodily ease, the drive to exploit the labor of others, and the failure to protect the poor and weak through law. It results in starvation, dispossession, and murder. Our social history will document these conclusions, and we shall discover which nations and classes have sinned against their neighbors. Finally, we shall suggest ways in which nations may act politically to alleviate these miserable economic and social conditions. Economic life can only be relieved through actions that transforms its social base (3.2), and the direction of social transformation is an exchange, in which the strong and powerful are weakened for the sake of the weak and dispossessed. In the church this exchange is effected by the gospel through repentance and forgiveness, in the outer sphere of the nations it is effected through social changes whose direction remotely reflects the direction of Jesus' reconciling actions (4.5). This implies political changes in behalf of the weaker classes and nations, and therefore we shall recommend that the weaker classes and nations increase their political power vis-a-vis the stronger nations, and that they act in ways that increase their economic advantage.
Our next step is to explicate our key Marxist concepts in relation to our Barthian categories, and from there to present the history pertinent to our interests. We do not intend to compare Marx and Barth in terms of theory, and we are not engaged in historical research to determine a precise historical account. We shall choose representative Marxist texts, orient their central categories in relation to our Barthian results, and by means of these categories focus upon the prominent features of their historical narration. Although these texts vary in their areas of historical concern, and even at times of fact, they converge with respect to their primary categories and they agree on the essential features of their historical narrative. We are interested in these essential features, and their narration will form the heart of this chapter. We may now advance by explicating our key categories in terms of our Barthian results.
The Historical and Social Basis of an Economic Analysis
By (2.3) and (2.4), economic life has its basis in social history. In terms of societies, we will narrow our field of vision to the capitalist countries, or to the non-communist countries, and also to recent history beginning with the rise of capitalism. Within that context our aim is to address the issue of economic suffering, commonly called "underdevelopment." We shall focus on Latin America, primarily Chile, especially in its relations with the United States, as a test case by which to analyze capitalist development in general.(4) Since economic life has its basis in social life, we must now specify the relevant social groupings within this social historical context. What social classes, or distinctive national groupings, should be singled out as the key to understanding this history, especially in its economic aspects? We are especially concerned with the behavior of nations. With respect to international politics and history, we shall, in light of (2.16), give first priority to national differences over class differences. Within a given nation, when language and history are held in common, we shall emphasize class differences. Grounds for doing so follow from the fact that economic motives are strong determinants of political action (2.5), (3.4), and (3.5). We are generalizing at this point. In actual practice class differences cut across nations, and national groupings are divided by differing languages and over-lapping classes. As a generalization we shall adopt the view that internationally, encounters among nations are of primary significance, and within nations, class groupings powerfully influence political affairs. Having said this, we may now divide the nations we wish to consider into two groups. Here we are influenced in part by Marxist writers, and, perhaps more forcefully, by common knowledge. Our major international division will be between the European countries, their colonial offspring in colonized territories such as the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Australia, and the remainder of the world that fell under European domination, such as Africa, portions of Asia, and Latin America. We make this distinction on the premise that the paramount international event of recent centuries shaping the nations within the Western orbit has been Europe's subjugation of the world, its exploitation, and resultant division into Europe and nations that continue Europe's political ascendancy, and those nations that have been dominated by the European nations. We must now relate these ideas to specific Marxist concepts. We begin with our requirement that economic relations be placed in a social and historical context.
According to Marxist economists, the fundamental distinction between themselves and bourgeois economists is that Marxist economists locate economic relations in the context of historically formed social relationships while their opponents do not.(5) The starting point for Marx's political and economic thought was that economic life occurred in the context of social historical relations. He began his introduction to his Critique of Political Economy (of which the four volumes on capital were to be the first part) with the statement that "The subject of our discussion is first of all material production by individuals as determined by society, which naturally constitutes the starting point."(6) From this beginning, Marx goes on to present the view that
while economic categories possess characteristics which are general and applicable to common types of human activity in all historical epochs, they also have characteristics which are historically specific and socially conditioned. From the point of view of a theory of development, it is these characteristics that provide the key to the operation of the economic mechanism in an historically given social formation.(7)
By contrast, and here we may quote David Horowitz on Marx, the
error committed by orthodox economists, according to Marx, lies in their not being aware of the socially conditioned characteristics of general economic categories and relationships, and hence in taking the given social arrangement as natural, harmonious, and eternal . . . they abstract from the historically specific character of economic categories and relationships and treat only their universal characteristics.(8)
Contemporary Marxist economists have continued Marx's distinction, and maintain that it is the chief distinction between themselves and orthodox economists. Paul Sweezy begins his Marxist analysis of capitalism by saying that it "would seem to be a legitimate conclusion that economics studies the social (inter-personal) relations of productions and distribution."(9) He goes on to say that although capitalist economists give lip- service to social reality, their "conceptual apparatus is intended to be so constructed as to transcend any particular set of social relations."(10) Samir Amin, in a similar vein, notes that these social formations must be studied historically: "Marx transcended economistic 'science,' subjecting it to a fundamental critique, and showed what must be the foundations of the only possible science, that of history."(11) Given this starting point, Marxist economists give an historical analysis of economic conditions, and secondly, they show the relevance of the historical formation and relationships among distinct political and social classes as constituting an essential element of economic life.
Apart from social history, economic life appears as a phenomenon in a non-personal realm as governed by non-historical eternal harmonies, usually mathematically described. This, according to the Marxists, is the essence of capitalist economics:
This "pure" economic science must necessarily be ahistorical, since the laws it seeks to discover have to be true whatever the economic and social system may be. Abandoning the universal outlook introduced by Marxism, breaking down the bridges that the latter had laid between the various branches of social science in its attempt to explain history, neoclassical economics was led to become, first and foremost, an algebra of logical deductions from a certain number of axioms based on a sketchy psychology of "eternal man."(12)
From our point of view, economic life can be transformed and renewed only by transforming its social base (2.3). An economic analysis that transcends social history denies the possibility of change, change understood here as the rerouting of the flow of the earth's products as transactions between classes and nations. A non-social analysis will doubtless include economic changes, as, for example, describing expansions and contractions in the economy; but it will not envision social actions whose objective is to reroute the flow of goods in behalf of certain nations and classes at the expense of others (3.2). It cannot envision such an alteration of the economic system since the flow of goods is not perceived as being related to national and class differences. Consequently, the capitalist analysis, at least from the Marxist point of view, is an ideology whose purpose is to maintain the privilege of certain classes and nations.(13) From our perspective, we would expect the development of an ideology of this type. Given the remoteness of the nations from their center, (4.8) and (4.9), and given the power of chaos and sin in this realm, (4.10), we would expect that the economic violence of nations, their accumulation of goods and their dispossession of others (3.4), their exploitation and lawlessness (3.5), would be concealed in an ideology which abstracts from social and historical relations (4.10). In this way sin as broken social relations among peoples is concealed, and the possibility of effecting repentance by altering the economic system on behalf of the dispossessed and exploited is denied.
Decisive Social Distinctions
We have said that our major international division will be between the European nations and their offspring, and those nations dominated and exploited by the European expansion which began in the sixteenth century. In actual practice, this is the perspective presented by Marxist writers. The nerve of their historical analysis of international capitalism concerns itself with relations among nations, primarily the European nations and their descendants in relation to the world's other nations. On a world scale, the initial decisive event was the world conquest by the European nations beginning in the sixteenth century. As Europe overran the world, two things, roughly speaking, occurred.(14) The Europeans either entered countries with little population or social structure, primarily North America, Australia, and South Africa, or they encountered complex civilizations with extensive populations. In the former case they settled these new territories, and established socioeconomic formations that were, in the main, an extension of their European origins.(15) In the case of extensive populations or complex social structures, socioeconomic formations evolved which differed from those of Europe and its extensions. We will designate the former socioeconomic formations, Western Europe, North America, Australia, and the exception Japan,(16) by the term "center." The latter group, South America, most of Africa, and portions of Asia, will be termed the "periphery." The socioeconomic formations in the periphery differ from those of the center in that they arose through differing historical processes. The difference arose, in part, from at least two factors. First, it is the tendency of all nations to overwhelm and exploit their neighbors, (2.15), (3.4), (3.5), (3.9), and (4.10). Secondly, this tendency toward economic exploitation can be implemented only through encounters among nations, classes, and persons, (2.3), and the center, until only very recently, possessed the military power to do just that. As a result, the formations in the center arose in part through internal developments and the exploitation of the periphery, while those in the periphery emerged through local conditions and the fact of exploitation. The nature of the exploitation differed with distinctive historical periods of capitalist development, but the fact of exploitation remained constant.(17) If these historical and social differences are ignored, then the belief may easily arise that progress in the periphery, or in the underdeveloped nations, can be achieved by following the recipes for success given in the developed nations. We cannot expect the periphery to duplicate the historical experience of the center, unless the periphery in turn dominate the center, for the crucial difference between center and periphery is that one suffered domination, the other dominated.(18) In other words, the key to their distinctiveness, is the social historical relation between center and periphery, and not a non-social process of historical development.
Economic Motives and Major Economic Categories
We may now inquire as to the basic economic motives that animate nations and classes. In light of previous results, we may say that the fundamental economic motive is the desire to accumulate (2.15), (3.4), (3.9), and (4.10). It operates through dispossession (3.4), the exploitation of the labor of others, (2.11) and (3.5), and it is carried out in ways that lead to death (3.4), and deny the weak the protection of law, (3.5) and (4.10).(19) In light of the empirical aspects of a Marxist analysis, the desire to accumulate has close affinities with their term "primitive accumulation." "Primitive accumulation" is a fundamental category for understanding the essential character of the capitalist system, and we shall directly relate it to the exploitation, deprivation, and death that normally follow from the unbridled drive to accumulate. In exploring the meaning of this term we shall relate it to two other terms, "surplus" and "surplus value." All three of these terms have inter-related meanings, and they are useful in describing how certain nations and classes are able to accumulate at the expense of others. We shall examine each of them in turn, beginning with the concept of "surplus."
With respect to accumulation, economic holdings may be divided into two quantities. First, the economic production that meets basic human needs, or the needs of society, and then the remainder. We will designate the remainder by the term "surplus," so that surplus refers to accumulation beyond one's basic needs, or beyond a society's basic needs for consumption. Virtually all societies accumulate surplus, and the surplus takes differing forms depending upon the socioeconomic nature of the society itself. In a primitive society it might simply mean the surplus of grain available at the end of the year, or in a Latin American country, it might take the form of the mineral and agricultural wealth created beyond consumption after a given period of time. In capitalist societies, an important characteristic form of surplus is the profits made by a given firm in the course of a year. In general, with respect to industrial societies, Paul Baran defines the surplus as
the difference between society's actual current output and its actual current consumption. It is thus identical with current saving or accumulation, and finds its embodiment in assets of various kinds added to society's wealth during the period in question: productive facilities and equipment, inventories, foreign balances, and gold hoards.(20)
When one considers a society's surplus, two questions arise: Who controls the surplus, and what is done with it? How a society uses its surplus is an expression of its fundamental values, and the power to use its surplus means that it has the option of directing its economic destiny. The surplus may be invested in the economic system, spent on war, or education, or expended for festivals, and each of these alternatives would represent a particular social value.
The size of the surplus is an index of productivity and wealth, of how much freedom a society has to accomplish whatever goals it may set for itself. The composition of the surplus shows how it uses that freedom: how much it invests in expanding its productive capacity, how much it consumes in various forms, how much its wastes and in what ways.(21)
The fact that Jesus commanded his followers to give their goods away to the poor indicates his fundamental value of service, and his apparent belief that God's supply was inexhaustible was an index of his freedom. As a society uses its surplus, it determines its economic future. For example, if a society decides to enhance the material existence of its citizens, then it must devote a portion of its surplus to expanded production. If a society has no surplus, or if its surplus is captured by others, then it cannot direct its future since it has nothing left beyond consumption. In this way surplus functions as the key to understanding a society's primary values and the direction of its economic life, and its power to use its surplus indicates its degree of freedom.
We have accepted accumulation as the driving force of economic systems. Therefore, the primary drive between nations and classes, is to appropriate the surplus of others. This accumulation at the expense of others can occur in varying forms. We shall distinguish two forms. Each of them, like all economic relations, has its basis in social history (2.3). First, once a given socioeconomic system has been established through social historical events, the appropriation of a major portion of the surplus by a given class or nation can occur through strictly economic means--simply as a function of the economic system itself. Marx described this type of accumulation in the case of capitalism, and his key concept was surplus value. Secondly, accumulation at the expense of others can occur outside the market, so to speak, and be the direct result of political historical factors. Plunder, for example, is a form of accumulation that is not determined by economic laws encompassing two social groupings, but by the decision of one group to rob another. This form of accumulation is termed "primitive accumulation." We shall briefly describe "surplus value" and then speak of "primitive accumulation."
In light of (2.14) and (3.7), the primary concern of economic life is the productiveness of the earth, the transformation of its products by labor, and their consumption with the aim of maintaining bodily existence as the necessary external basis of covenant. The result of labor is a flow of goods garnered from the earth, their transformation by labor, and then distributed among nations, classes, and individuals. By (2.11), this flow of goods represents a network of service between workers and consumers, in which differing parties contribute reciprocally in varying degrees to the economic welfare of others. Marx began with the fact that this flow occurs through commodity exchanges, and that commodities embody work, and this work is a form of service and or slavery in behalf of those who consume or control the manufactured commodities.(22) Virtually all, if not all, societies carry out commodity exchanges, and the nature of the exchange depends upon the social nature of the society itself. Socially, capitalism can be characterized as possessing two classes. There are those who begin with money. They use it to buy materials, machinery, and labor, and from these ingredients they produce goods which are then sold for money. This class begins and ends with money. There is another class who sell their labor. The necessary prerequisites of capitalism are free capital and labor for sale.(23) The laborer is normally paid in cash, which in turn is used to buy products that embody labor as well. The source of the capitalist's profits is that the wages, or the value of the products the workers can buy with their wages, is less than the value of the products produced by the labor itself. That is, the material wealth consumed by the workers with their wages is less than the material wealth they have created by their work. The difference between these two amounts of wealth is "surplus value" and it is monetarily represented as profits. Profit is the difference in costs between the initial investment plus wages and the final selling prices of the produced goods. The capitalist owns these profits, and spends a portion of them on luxury, (3.4), and thereby, in comparison to the workers, is able to capture a disproportionate share of the total flow of goods as routed by labor. In this way the upper classes are served by the lower (2.11), and they are able to accumulate the wealth created by the whole of society through strictly economic processes as institutionally grounded. Furthermore, the capitalist class directs the use of the surplus itself, and its direction reflects its fundamental value which is greater profits. This can be achieved in various ways, but one important way is to hold down wages in relation to final selling costs. This approach reaches a limit, however, when production so increases against buying power that a recession or down-turn occurs. This, of course, lowers profits. A pattern of erratic booms and recessions is the result, and Marx was the first to discern this pattern. Recessions can be avoided, however, by finding foreign markets for excess production, and profits can be increased by importing cheap or scarce materials or products, or by using cheap foreign labor through overseas investments. In this way the dynamics of the system inevitably drive the system beyond itself. In Amin's words: "It is the contradiction between the capacity to produce and the capacity to consume, constantly arising and constantly being overcome--the essential law of capitalist accumulation--which accounts both for the inherent tendency for the extension of markets and for the international movement of capital."(24) Our task will be to describe the impact of capitalism on periphery nations. One element will be the inherent lawlessness, (3.5) and (4.10), of capitalism itself. Although the surplus is produced socially, its outlet is not socially determined by law. The system uses its surplus in terms of its primary value, more profits. In the main, profits must be invested in the drive for more profits, and this unchecked drive has had tremendous effects upon other nations. We shall investigate those effects historically.
The term "primitive accumulation" is of fundamental importance for our study. Its basis is the belief that during the major historical periods of capitalism the center has appropriated the surplus of the periphery and that the result has been the underdevelopment of the periphery. "Underdevelopment" is a polite word for what we have described as the consequence of sin (2.7). Underdevelopment is the result of the primary sin, the lust to accumulate, and its results are dispossession, hunger, and death (3.4), the exploitation of others, (2.11) and (3.5), and the failure to protect the weak and poor through law, (3.5) and (4.10). Amin links underdevelopment and primitive accumulation as follows:
The phenomenon of underdevelopment is thus merely the result of the persistence of the order of primitive accumulation for the benefit of the center, and our problem consists of studying the successive forms of these phenomena in relation to the transformations taking place at the center. Primitive accumulation is not something that belongs to the prehistory of capital, it is something permanent, contemporary.(25)
We will not, at this point, describe the term "primitive accumulation" in any depth; its meaning will become evident as we portray its reality. We will, however, make two observations. First, the term "primitive" indicates that the phenomenon in question is the result of historical and social conditions, and not the result of strictly economic factors. In describing surplus value, we noted that one class was able to control the surplus through economic factors, through the workings of the capitalist system itself as historically and socially institutionalized. "Primitive accumulation" refers to accumulation that cannot be understood in strictly economic terms, but must be historically described as emerging through social relations. In the earliest phases of European advance, primitive accumulation occurred through such events as plunder and slavery; in later phases the periphery served as a market, and its minerals and agricultural products were exploited at a fraction of their social worth; and still later, the appropriation occurred through unequal exchanges in which products produced in the center increased in value against those produced in the periphery. In each of these cases, political factors were decisive. Slavery and plunder, for example, depended upon military conquest, and unequal exchange is partially the result of the fact that labor cannot freely cross international boundaries. In short, the term "primitive accumulation" refers to the fact, (2.3), that economic life has its basis in social history, and it is used to describe economic relations among differing societies, or differing socioeconomic formations. "Here, then, is the problem of accumulation on a world scale, where relations between different formations are concerned, politics is dominant, and this is why we have to look at these relations as bound up with the analysis of primitive accumulation, and not with that of expanded production."(26) Secondly, we shall note in passing that capitalism in the center has been mitigated by law. By contrast, and this is due in part to the center's repressive policies, capitalism in the periphery has not been so restrained by social legislation. Consequently, in light of (3.4) and (3.5), we would expect that the lawless drive for profits would result in the periphery's underdevelopment, in dispossession, poverty, starvation, and exploitation. We shall show that this is the case.
History--Social and Economic Factors
Finally, as we describe the interactions between and within center and periphery we shall do so historically. But this brings us to a question: What view of history shall we adopt as we present historical material? We cannot adopt the Marxist view of historical materialism as if the outer history of the nations were advancing toward a goal within history itself (4.8). Certain elements of the Marxist analysis, however, are helpful to us, and reflect what we have already learned from Barth. Above all, we have seen that economic and social life are inextricably related, and Marxist economic historians relate economic and political life in a dynamic fashion. By (2.5) and (3.5) we would expect economic motives to be strong determinants of political action, and Marxists take the view that a primary aim of nations and classes is to strengthen their economic position within the productive process. At any given moment, various classes and nations exist in relation to the productive process, and given that relation, classes and power blocks arise as shaped by a common interest or relation to productive forms. Those that benefit from the given economic conditions seek to perpetuate them, those that do not, seek to change them, and therefore competing social factions arise. The various social factions interact politically with one another and with the productive system itself as they seek to change it to their advantage. Because of this competition and shifting alliances, the productive system is transformed through political action, and this in turn gives rise to new classes and differing political alliances which again reshape the economic system. At each stage of this process, distinct social units are conscious of the fact that their existence depends upon an advantageous relation to the productive process. Classes cannot emerge or endure if they have little relation to the productive system, and therefore the productive system "sets the limits" of social life, or, in our terminology, economic life is an indispensable basis for a viable social life (2.5).(27) In this way social and economic factors mutually condition each other and are dynamically related. Cardoso and Faletto express the matter as follows:
An economic class or group tries to establish through the political process a system of social relations that permits it to impose on the entire society a social form of production akin to its own interests; or at least it tries to establish alliances or to control the other groups or classes in order to develop an economic order consistent with its interests and objectives. The modes of economic relations, in turn, set the limits of political action.(28)
This perspective differs from the stereotypical view which holds that Marxism reduces social life to economic affairs. Criticizing this reductionistic view, Amin comments:
This "theory" confuses the mode of production with social formations and so fails to analyze the connections between the different instances (economic, political, ideological, etc.), that characterize the differing modes of production, and the various ways in which they are combined in the social formations known to history. It sets up as dogma the ultimate determination of everything else by the economic factors, and gives the same content to this factor in all the differing modes of production.(29)
In general, contemporary Marxist historians take the view that the "truth is the whole" and various factors, economic, political, and ideological, are given varying weights depending upon concrete historical circumstances, although economic and social factors are the most significant.(30) We shall follow Marxist historians in that they dynamically relate social and economic affairs, but we cannot conclude that this dynamic interaction will lead to long-lasting economic and social solutions, or that history is moving inevitably toward the victory of socialism within history itself.(31) We are now ready to present our historical description.
Introduction to a History
The history of capitalism can roughly be divided into three periods.(32) The earliest period began with the Discoveries and lasted until the Industrial Revolution and approximately spanned the years from 1500 to the eighteenth century. This earliest phase has been called the pre-history of capitalism, or the mercantilist phase. The second period is dated by the emerging Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, and lasts until the formation of the large corporate monopolies in the 1880's. This second period has been called the classical period of capitalist growth. The final phase, the monopolistic period, lasts from the late nineteenth century until the present. This final stage, may be divided into two periods, from 1880 until the depression and World War II, and from the war until the present. We shall begin our study with the final stages of the middle period as it evolved into monopoly capitalism. Our study will break down into five sections: a brief introduction to early and middle capitalism, aspects of the middle period and its evolution into monopoly capitalism, monopoly capitalism until the Depression and World War II, the Depression and World War II, and from the War until 1970. Our study will emphasize Chile as a concrete example of general developments, and will conclude with the election of Allende in 1970.
European Expansion and Early Capitalism
Early in the sixteenth century, the Western European nations began to conquer and exploit major portions of the globe. Through plunder, trade, and mercantilist operations, the surplus of the conquered and occupied territories began to find its way into western Europe. The social basis of this wealth was European expansion and conquest. This wealth, in the words of Paul Baran, "had the usual tendency to snowball."(33) These amassed fortunes, in conjunction with technological advance, new institutional formations, and a mobile work force released through the breakup of the feudal estates, led to the development of an incipient capitalism which grew in magnitude and complexity until it assumed the proportions of the Industrial Revolution and the middle or classical period of capitalist development. Throughout the mercantilist period Latin America was, of course, dominated by Spain. As the mercantilist phase gave way to the classical period of European capitalism, Spain's power, both at home and abroad, was weakened with the result that in the early nineteenth century her Latin American colonies successfully revolted. The revolt of the colonies made direct trade with Europe, especially Britain, a reality and thereby set the stage for a new form of economic development, that of growing economic ties with Britain as she developed into a manufacturing economy.(34) By 1850, the chaos and uncertainty surrounding the wars of independence in Latin America and the formation of new nation states, had, in the main subsided. After 1850 there was a period of rapid economic growth throughout most of Latin America. In this period the center was developing and her need for raw materials rose correspondingly. Latin American economies were integrated into the international economy, with exports centering in minerals and agricultural products.(35) Chile expanded rapidly as well, exports being the driving force of her expansion. "As was natural and until then necessary, external commerce became the driving force of the domestic economic system, linking, with intimate bonds, the course and future of our development to the fluctuations of the world economy, or, more concretely, to the dominant countries, above all England"(36) Chile's exports were mainly, copper, silver, and agricultural products, and the mining and agricultural sectors each expanded by a multiple of five or six times between the years 1844 and 1860.(37) Internationally, the world economy was transformed from its mercantilist form of supplying the center with precious minerals or exotic agricultural products, to one of supplying raw materials and agricultural products in exchange for manufactured goods, especially textiles. These developments could take place only in the context of political developments that profoundly affected the world. Western Europe's imperial expansion was proceeding apace, and this had profound repercussions for the countries of Asia and Africa. Portions of Asia and Africa were being conquered and colonized, and these peripheral countries, together with Latin America, were integrated into the international market in a variety of ways, depending upon local conditions and the particular needs of the center.(38) With respect to Chile, these political transformations were not as drastic as those occurring in other areas. In Pinto's view, the decisive post-independence regime of Diego Portales (1830-37) "established republican forms of government for the economic-social structure of the 'ancien regime,' which in essence did not change one whit with the coming of Independence, except for the expulsion of a few Spaniards."(39) As these developments were taking place throughout the nineteenth century, the center made the transition from classical to monopoly capitalism, reaching the latter form near the end of the century. We shall now describe that transformation and its world-wide impact. We shall observe that the drive for new territories which began with Europe's expansion received a new economic impetus resulting from the inherent lawlessness of capitalist development, and that the results were dispossession, hunger, and mass murder.
Transition to Monopoly Capitalism and Its Impact
Classical capitalism was characterized by many small capitalist firms competing with one another through prices. In the late nineteenth century this form of capitalist development gave way to the formation of giant oligopolistic firms which do not generally compete through competitive pricing. There are doubtless many factors leading to this development. A primary reason was the fact that technological innovations often required large-scale operations to enable their cost-cutting capabilities to be fully realized. Furthermore, large scale operations are generally more competitive than smaller ones, having the capability not only to produce more cheaply, but to withstand a protracted economic decline or price war. The smaller firms dropped out of the market leaving the larger firms to dominate the field. Initially, these firms engaged in some degree of economic warfare through price cutting. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that "live and let live" was more profitable than all-out price competition. This tended to mitigate against a lowering of prices, and after 1880 prices and then wages began to rise all over the industrial world.(40) Although the big firms continued to compete in other areas, through advertising, styling, and new markets, the general end of price competition led to a narrowing of a firm's investment possibilities. Under a competitive system, a firm is forced to innovate if a new technology makes production cheaper, since a competitor will drive down prices with the new technology. Under monopoly, this is not inevitably the case. Since prices will remain about the same or rise, the issue here is whether or not the new equipment will pay for itself to the degree that it compensates for the value of the replaced equipment. It is often best to let the old equipment amortize before investing in a new technology. Furthermore, for the system as a whole, the lessening of competition led to fewer bankruptcies and a consequent saving of invested capital. The result is a net capital gain. "What this means, however, is that under conditions of monopoly outlays on technological improvements as well as capital losses-- both important forms of the utilization of the economic surplus under capitalism--are significantly reduced."(41) Furthermore, given the competition of competitive capitalism, a firm should produce to capacity if its price is competitive, since no one firm's production can saturate the market. Under monopoly, a firm's vast size implies limits on production at the point where it is calculated that increased production will exceed demand relative to a given price for the product. The combined result of all these factors is that firms are faced with growing capital surpluses which must find outlets beyond the firms themselves. Firms expanded horizontally and vertically, and in the late nineteenth century and into this century a growing percentage of capitalist businesses became owned or controlled by a few major corporations which tended to dominate the entire productive system.
It is apparent . . . that there has been a more or less steady upward trend in the concentration of control exercised by the corporate giants. Thus, the 200 largest non-financial corporations increased their relative importance from ownership of one-third of the assets in 1909 to 48 percent in 1929 and to 55 percent in the early thirties.(42)
The reorganization of the corporate system through concentrations in giant firms does not, however, solve the problem of surpluses for the system as a whole. As the system as a whole expanded into its monopoly phase, the need for raw materials and new markets, which began with classical capitalistic development, expanded as well. The formation of monopolies, however, created huge surpluses of investment-seeking capital which could not be accommodated by the center itself. The crux of the matter was that the working population created significantly greater wealth than it consumed, and this wealth, in the form of capital from profits, was forced to go abroad, and it did so.
First, export of capital from the oldest centers of capitalism became really substantial only after about 1880. Great Britain's capital exports increased from 100 million pounds in 1825-30 to 210 million pounds in 1854 and 1.3 billion pounds in 1880 and then rose to 3.763 billion pounds in 1913 . . . and for the United States from 500 million dollars in 1896 to 1. 5 billion dollars in 1914, 18.583 billion dollars in 1922 and 25.202 billion dollars in 1933.(43)
The penetration of the world by capital led to the incorporation of indigenous commercial systems into the expanding capitalist system. This could not, however, take place without a political context in which the commercial exchange could occur. The conquest and domination of the world which began with the Discoveries reached its zenith at the close of the nineteenth century. Lenin, quoting from Hobson's classic work on imperialism comments as follows:
Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-1900 as being those of the greatest colonial 'expansion' of the chief European States. According to his estimate, Britain acquired during these years, 3,700,000 square miles of territory with a population of 57,000,000 inhabitants; France acquired 3,600,000 square miles with a population of 36,000,000; Germany, 1,000,000 square miles with 14,700,000 inhabitants; Belgium, 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants; Portugal, 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The hunt of all the capitalist States for colonies at the end of the 19th century is a fact well-known in the history of diplomacy and foreign affairs.(44)
The political, and then economic, domination of the world did not take place without struggle and conflict. As the big cartels and their national backers carved up the world in their ceaseless quest for markets, investments, and raw materials, a blood bath exploded throughout the world as the capitalist powers crushed indigenous rebellions and eventually plunged the globe into the first of two world wars.
A frantic armaments race [after 1880] among the Great Powers began absorbing growing parts of their national output and became the most important single factor in determining the level of their economic activity. In quick succession the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish- American War, the Boer War, the bloody suppression of the Boxer rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Chinese Revolution in 1911-1912, and finally the First Word War ushered in the present epoch of the development of capitalism--the epoch of imperialism, wars, national and social revolutions.(45)
Certainly war has been an enduring fact of human existence, but the characteristic fact of these wars is that they had their roots in the imperialism of the major powers, made inevitable in part, by the needs of capital--raw materials, capital outlets, and markets.(46) That the needs of capital should so dominate human decisions and actions flowed from the structure of the capitalist system itself. Although the wealth was produced socially, even globally, in that it arose through the labor of workers enmeshed in supportive social and economic structures, the surplus was appropriated and directed by only a few, that is, the major corporations and investment institutions. Within its socioeconomic context, capital's choices were limited. Profits had to be invested in expanded production, not only at home, but abroad as well. The need to expand abroad naturally allied itself with an imperial political policy, which led to political conquest and economic integration. In this way Mammon came to direct and dominate human affairs, and conquest and killing, (3.4), was and is the inevitable result. Had there been options other than expanded production, had the surplus been subject to law in behalf of weaker nations and classes, the imperial expansion may not have taken its peculiarly vicious form. But capitalism was limited in its use of the surplus, and, in spite of a larger state role, it has not essentially changed in this respect.
With respect to relations between Latin America and the center, the formation of monopolies coincided with what Donghi calls the "maturation of the neocolonial order."(47) The Spanish colonial order, defeated early in the century, was replaced by a new form of colonialism, with its center first in Britain, and then increasingly, the United States. "In 1880--a few years more or less--the advance in almost all of Hispanic America of an economy based on exports and primary products signified the final replacement of the colonial pact imposed by the Iberian metropolis for a new colonial order."(48) As a result of the formation of monopolies with large surpluses, there were large flows of British and American capital into Latin America. North Americans came to own portions of Latin America, its lands, mines, banks, ports, and railroads. In 1902 the United States proclaimed the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe doctrine. According to this corollary, any Latin American nation becoming amiss in its debts could be subject to foreign action only by the United States, even if the debt was owed to a country other than the United States. This corollary was accompanied by a sudden increase in North American military interventions. "There were further interventions: Panama in 1917, 1918, and 1925; Haiti, occupied by marines from 1915 to 1934; the Dominican Republic, occupied from 1916 to 1924; Nicaragua, occupied by the marines from 1912 to 1925; and in Mexico, the disembarcation in Veracruz of 1914 and the Pershing Expedition of 1916."(49) These interventions have continued throughout this century, and are only the more visible manifestation of numerous coercive actions, each indicating the power of the oligopolies to use the state as an extension of their commercial policy. In Paul Baran's words: "As a consequence in all of its operations in the international arena a large enterprise in an advanced capitalist country can throw upon the scales not merely its own prodigious financial power but also the enormous resources of its country's national government."(50) Our next step is to describe the effect on the periphery, politically and economically, of the center's expansion in the late nineteenth century and into this century. The primary effect was that the economies and political systems of the periphery became integrated around the center. We will describe the economic consequences of this integration--economic chaos, unemployment, hunger, and exploitation (3.4 and 3.5). Furthermore, we shall note that the failure to provide the external basis of a secure economic environment results in social chaos (2.5) as well. Roughly speaking, the time period for this discussion will span from the latter part of the nineteenth century until the Depression and World War II.
The Integration of the Periphery
Several typical features characterize the integration of national economies into the global capitalist economy as it developed in the late nineteenth century and into this century. First, the exposure to cheap foreign imports, especially textiles, destroyed indigenous manufacture. Secondly, agriculture was integrated into the world system. It become progressively oriented toward export crops, and this was often hastened by the consolidation of agricultural lands into large holdings. Thirdly, the mineral resources of a given country were used for export to the center. At one time these may have been nationally owned, but with the expansion of capital and/or military conquest in the late nineteenth century, these often fell, as did the productive facilities in general, into the hands of Europeans or North Americans. This was the case with Chile. All of these developments became intensified in the monopoly phase of capitalist development, and have continued, with some modifications, into the present. We need to examine these matters in greater detail, beginning with the destruction of local manufacture.
Mass production rapidly decreased the cost of manufactured goods produced by the center in the nineteenth century. Given the center's need for markets, these goods were shipped abroad where they competed with locally produced goods. These local goods, usually hand-crafted, could not compete in price with the center's mass-produced products, and the foreign products eliminated the crafts as a local industry with any significant output. The result was substantial unemployment, as well as the further stifling of any indigenous manufacture of a capitalist type that may have occurred. This took place throughout the periphery in the nineteenth century.(51) In this respect the history of the center is markedly different. The crux of the difference is that there was employment in the center since it produced for both center and periphery, but widespread unemployment in the periphery, since it no longer created its own manufacture. Contrasting the development of center and periphery in this respect, Samir Amin comments:
Whereas at the start of the development of European capitalism there was investment of indigenous capital, and the creation of manufactures that put on the market products that till then had been supplied by the crafts, we find that, at the start, in the economies that were to become underdeveloped there was penetration by products of foreign industry. Here we perceive a process of capitalist development that is very different from the other one. The ruined craftsmen are not absorbed by local industrial development. In the European schema, the new-type industry recruited its labor force from among the ruined craftsmen. In the colonial schema, overall demand was sharply reduced by the introduction of manufactured goods. The ruined craftsmen were doomed to unemployment.(52)
Paul Baran describes the same phenomenon as characteristic of the periphery as a whole, and gives an especially devastating account of the ruin of India, drawing upon a variety of historical sources.(53) With respect to Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto point out that local merchants were eliminated by the advent of foreign competition, since they "had no means of defending themselves against their European competitors."(54) In the case of Chile, it is Pinto's view that a policy of "free trade," which was certainly appropriate for Britain with its powerful industry, was nothing but suicide for the development of Chilean industry. As it was, however, the ideology and policy of free trade "was applied as a revealed truth, with ominous consequences for our economic development."(55) Chile adopted a policy of free trade since its dominant political parties were not connected with manufacture, but rather, consisted of the landowners and the commercial/financial class associated with foreign trade. The fact that foreign imports were allowed to replace local crafts was a political decision. In some cases the decision was simply forced upon the peripheral country by the colonial power. In other cases, as in Chile, the decision was made by a combination of local and foreign interests and justified by the laissez-faire ideology. The decision worked to the advantage of those sectors oriented toward export, but in Pinto's view, it did not help the mass of the population. The virtual destruction of the crafts, and the squelching of incipient industries, led to the creation of an unemployed, or underemployed work force. Where could they go for work? Their choices were three-fold, agriculture, mining, or services. We will consider each of these in order.
Agriculture
Prior to the advent of foreign goods, local craftsmen had been agriculture's principle market. With the destruction of domestic manufacture, manufactured products could be obtained only from the center in exchange for products useful to the center itself. To a growing degree agriculture became oriented toward exports which led to a transformation in agriculture itself.(56) In some areas, notably those occupied by imperial conquest, primarily Africa and Southeast Asia, large agricultural units were formed and directed by emigres from the center who used local labor. In certain cases, higher profits could be realized by leaving the peasants on the land and buying their products. It was, however, frequently profitable to expropriate peasant holdings and use them in large commercial holdings oriented toward export. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Church and Indian lands in Latin America were expropriated and consolidated into large estates. The reasons were two-fold, an awareness of the money to be made in exports, and also, the recognition of rising demand in towns and cities.(57) This process occurred in Chile as well. By 1929, as few as 249 proprietors owned 16 million hectares of land, while as many as 74,000 small farmers owned 865,000 hectares.(58) This represents an extraordinary concentration of agricultural lands, and as of 1965, this level of concentration has been maintained.(59) Amin reports similar processes at work in Africa.(60) The process of concentration took place simultaneously with an increase in rural population. This is due to the fact that displaced craftsmen, especially those who may own some land, are, in part, reduced to agricultural laborers or small farmers. With the passage of time the density in the rural areas of these small farmers or agricultural laborers on the land increased, as their increased population could not find adequate employment in manufacture as a result of foreign competition. The result is an impoverished rural mass in conjunction with a small class of wealthy landowners.(61) At a time when the center was experiencing an increase in the percentage of people employed by industry and a decrease in the agricultural population, the periphery, on the whole, was experiencing a decline in the percentage of people employed in manufacture and an increase in rural population, since local manufacture was in the process of disintegration as rural population intensified.(62) Furthermore, the existence of a large rural mass owning a small percentage of the land, and a small landowning class owning a large percentage of the land, tends to limit the modernization of agriculture. Because of their large holdings and abundant labor, landowners could secure a goodly income without the risk of capital investment for modernization. Capital investment in agriculture was precarious because of such factors as slow returns of capital investments in agriculture, high interest rates in peripheral countries, large fluctuations in international commodity prices, and an abundance of cheap labor.(63) These conditions held in Chile as well. When the landowners did borrow money, it was not to improve production, but rather for consumption, or to buy more land.(64) In addition to the factors just mentioned, inflation plagued Chile's economy and land was used as a hedge against inflation.(65) Land as security would be threatened if it was used for highly-productive farming entailing capital investment. As a result much of Chile's agricultural land is scarcely or poorly used. As of 1965 only 36.6 percent of the arable land was in production, only 25.1 percent of the pasture land, and there was irrigation of only 40 percent of the land that could be irrigated.(66) Most of Chile's actual production occurred in the smaller landholdings; the large fincaspossessing 72 percent of arable land in 1965 had less land under cultivation than the small landowners who occupied about one-sixth of the arable land.(67)
Several results follow from the foregoing. First, and here Pinto contrasts Chile's development with that of the United States,(68) agriculture did not generate an economic surplus that could be channeled back into increased agricultural production. In the United States, farms were normally family owned, and worked for the benefit of the owners who used the surplus to expand their own production and as a market for a growing internal industry. By contrast, Chilean agriculture produced little surplus, and that surplus was frequently spent on luxury imports rather than expanded agricultural production. Nor could the agricultural surplus initiate manufacture, since its relatively small amounts could not compete with the price-cutting potential of foreign manufacture. One alternative would have been a land tax. This would have forced production, and the taxes could have been used to generate industry if sufficiently protected. But the landowners in Chile came to possess formidable political power, and they have been able to circumvent attempts to tax their extensive holdings and income.(69) Consequently, the agricultural surplus is consumed and wasted by the wealthy land-owning class itself. They cater to the external market as consumers of its luxury items in exchange for their agricultural products, and therefore they advocate a policy of free trade. This holds for the periphery in general.(70) The result is inadequate agricultural production and rural impoverishment. In the case of Chile, for example, agricultural products composed approximately 45 percent of Chile's exports in the middle of the nineteenth century. By the twentieth century agricultural production in Chile was increasingly unable to meet Chile's food requirements, including a number of foods she was capable of producing.(71) By the 1960's, agricultural imports were amounting to some 200 million dollars worth per year.(72) In light of the foregoing, the consequence for the periphery of capitalist aggression from the outside was the destruction of local manufacture, the stifling of industry, and the creation of a large, mainly rural, impoverished mass. Samir Amin, speaking for the periphery as a whole comments:
The only possible outcome of this situation is a general increase in unemployment in the rural areas (owing to the steady increase in population which cannot find outlets in industry) and in the towns (where displaced craftsmen are only partly re-employed, in trade and personal services, since there are no industries). An equilibrium of retrogression, marked by substantial and growing unemployment, both rural and urban, is thus the consequence of this mode of transition engendered by the aggression of capitalism from without.(73)
In short, the drive for profits from abroad, in coordination with the greed of a wealthy land-owning class, has had the expected results--dispossession and hunger (3.4).
This condition of economic deprivation can be overcome only by a significant change in the social relations among those classes that relate to the land. The direction of this change would need to be in favor of the dispossessed, (3.4) and (2.15). The consolidation of land into the hands of a few families in Chile, however, has led to the emergence of a very powerful landowning class. This class, together with the commercial/financial class oriented toward exports, has dominated Chilean political life. With the advent of the depression and World War II the landowners have been partially challenged by an emerging urban proletariat, but even then, they have been able to exercise formidable political power. Their primary political aim has been to resist any efforts that undermined their hegemony in the rural areas, such as land reform, and they have always advocated a policy of free trade as this gave them access to foreign manufacture and luxury goods. With respect to land reform, Pinto believes that Chile could significantly increase agricultural production by parceling out the large land-holdings in sizes large enough to support families or cooperatives, but not so large that they can support their owners without making good use of their productive potential.(74) Real efforts in this direction were carried out for the first time by Eduardo Frei (1964-70). After three years of intense resistance he made some headway, and the process was accelerated under Salvador Allende, but internal and external pressure precipitated the collapse of the Allende government.
We have been discussing developments in the period from the middle to late period of capitalist development up until the Depression and World War II. We have noted that foreign manufacture destroyed the indigenous crafts and indicated the effect on agriculture. In this section, we will describe developments in mining and exports, and make a few additional comments on agriculture. We will focus more directly on the United States in its relation to Latin America, specifically Chile, and indicate similarities with the periphery as a whole as the discussion proceeds. In this period the United States began to overtake Britain as the world's major industrial power, and eventually, subsequent to World War II, became the dominant trading partner with Latin America. Our point of departure for this section will be the formation of the monopolies in the late nineteenth century and their need for capital outlets.
Mining and Exports
The capital flows that entered the periphery in greater amounts after 1880 took two basic forms.(75) In certain cases, those areas where indigenous agriculture was the dominant economic activity, the foreign capital scarcely appeared at all, except in the commercial/financial sector concerned with the exchange of foreign manufacture for locally produced agricultural products. In other cases, those areas exporting commodities from mines or large plantations, large amounts of capital were invested in the export of these commodities with the result that peripheral economies became oriented toward exports and thereby dependent upon the foreign market.(76) Furthermore, the export sectors of these countries came to be controlled from abroad. The result for a number of Latin America countries was the loss of local control of their export sectors, as well as portions of their national productive systems.(77) Subsequent to independence, Latin American export sectors had, for the most part, been locally owned. After 1880, major portions of Latin American mines, plantations, transportation systems, shipping, and ports came to be owned by foreign interests. These interests were primarily British, though a growing percentage was North American.(78) Chile lost control of her export sector as well. By virtue of being the victor in the War of the Pacific (1879-82), Chile had taken possession of the Peruvian nitrate mines. Shortly after the war, a large number of nitrate shares were purchased at ten to twenty percent of their value by a foreigner who used money borrowed from a Valparaiso bank. At the time the nitrates were taken from Peru, foreign capital represented only about 13 percent of the shares, the rest belonged to Chile and Peru, and a small fraction was economically nationalized foreign capital. By 1910, however, Chile owned only 15 percent, the remainder being owned by foreigners, primarily British and American.(79) As a result, Chile received virtually no benefit from the exploitation of this valuable resource, netting about one-half of one percent on the value of her nitrate exports. This was an enormous loss, about two million pounds per year as of 1900.(80) In Pinto's view, this loss could have been avoided had Chileans not grown accustomed to passivity in the face of foreign enterprise. "In other words, the impotence of the 'active forces' of society in this period implied that for every 100 pesos produced by the nitrates, there remained only about 40 to 50 centavos for the use of the country."(81) In this same period Chile lost her merchant marine in its entirety. In the space of ten years, from 1861-1870, the Chilean merchant marine totally disappeared, going from 267 ships to zero.(82) The primary result of these developments for Chile, and for the periphery as a whole, was a great loss of her surplus. This surplus, in the form of mineral and agricultural wealth, flowed out of the periphery and contributed materially to the productive capacity and living standard of the center. Reciprocally, there was a return flow of luxury items and manufacture, but this flow did not significantly benefit major portions of the population. Had the surplus remained within the country, it could have contributed to the formation of industry (if sufficiently protected) and increased consumption, and thereby generated real economic growth. There was, of course, the building up of an infrastructure whose purpose was to help relieve the country of its wealth. We shall see in a future section, however, that the value of the removed assets far exceeded the value of the infrastructure created for their removal, and further, when the point was reached when those assets were exhausted or no longer of value, the foreign company simply left, leaving an infrastructure which may or may not have little value for the country as a whole.(83) Finally, the surplus, or its equivalent, may have remained in the country if the peripheral country could significantly tax the proceeds from foreign investment and use them to develop the local economy. This possibility entails a degree of autonomous political power. Chile tried to do this on several occasions, and we will discuss this possibility shortly.
One result of the penetration of foreign capital was the formation of what Cardoso and Faletto call "enclave economies."(84) An enclave economy is comprised of two or more sectors, each of which scarcely interpenetrates the other. Chile's extractive industries are an example, first with nitrates, and then more recently with copper. The mining sector is an extension of the foreign economy, and the remainder of the country exists with little economic relation to the foreign extension. An enclave economy is a particular case of a more general economic characteristic, that of being disarticulate. An economy is disarticulate if its various sectors carry on only marginal economic exchanges with one another, the primary exchanges of each sector being with the outside world. A prominent feature of peripheral economies is their disarticulate structure,(85) and one consequence of a disarticulate economy is that progress in one sector does not lead to the expansion and development of other sectors.(86) In a diverse and articulate economy the exploitation of a mineral resource, for example, would enhance the development of the economy as a whole. Industries would be created to provide mining equipment, smelters erected to process the ore, and wages would be paid to consume goods produced, for the most part, by the country itself. Even when the mines run out, the associated industrial complex remains in place and ore can be imported. In a disarticulate economy, like that of Chile, there may be a minor boom induced by the building of the infrastructure to export the ore, but the mining equipment is purchased abroad, the ore is refined abroad, and the wages paid to the workers is, for the most part, spent on imported products. When the mines run out, or the needs of the center change, the mine falls into desuetude, and the only significant change, from the periphery's view, is that a valuable resource has been wasted. The example of Chile's nitrates is a case in point.(87)
Finally, the invasion of foreign capital oriented toward export commodities did not solve the problem of unemployment and poverty which were due to the destruction of local manufacture. In the period we are considering, 1880 until World War II, the export of capital established very little local manufacture. When the exported capital developed mining it gave some temporary employment while an infrastructure was being built. Modern mining, however, is capital intensive and provides employment for only a few. On the whole, extractive industries provide very little income to peripheral countries unless they are locally owned or locally taxed. That, in general, did not happen, they were owned and exploited by the center, and therefore they contributed little to growth outside the mining sector itself.(88) Plantation economies, though they may employ many workers, are not obliged to pay high wages, since there is an abundance of labor resulting from the exclusion of peasants from their lands, the destruction of the crafts, as well as the fact that employment may exist only on a seasonal basis.
The consolidation and/or commercialization of agriculture, the destruction of the crafts through the competition of foreign manufacture, the establishment of a mining enclave employing few people, and plantations of forced or poorly paid labor, all of these create a situation where a great mass of the population is either unemployed or poorly employed. Where can these people find work? Three possibilities remain, but only one is viable: the commercial/financial sector, the state, and the services. In general, the commercial/financial sector exists in proportion to the size of a country's economic activity, and does not represent a sizable portion of the population in countries lacking significant industrial production. Secondly, the state must have considerable power vis-a-vis the agricultural, commercial/financial, and foreign interests, to appropriate a sizable portion of their surplus for public employment. In general, the state directly represents or is the foreign power, or, as in the case of Chile, the state represents the agricultural and commercial interests who are opposed to taxing their own incomes. This leaves only one other alternative, the service sector.
The Services
A study of the center from the nineteenth century until World War II reveals that the number of people in agriculture has declined markedly, and that the corresponding growth in industry and services has occurred in roughly equal proportions. By contrast, the periphery in this period did not witness a significant decrease in rural population, and the growth in the service sector was much greater than in industry.(89) This historical development results, in Amin's view, from three basic causes: the lack of industry in comparison to the center, the higher rates of unemployment in the periphery which appears in a disguised form in the service sector, and a much stronger landowning class in the periphery whose surpluses are spent on imported luxury goods and local services.(90) These conclusions hold, in the main, for Chile as well. In Pinto's view the distortion of the economy toward the service sector is due to two primary causes. First, local capital is strong enough for only the small outlays required by service enterprises, and secondly, the very unequal distribution of income in favor of a small wealthy class implies that the remainder of the population naturally gravitates toward serving this class, for it is only there that money can be earned.(91) After World War II, the center also experienced a growth in the service sector. But there is a difference in the nature of this growth from its growth in the periphery. The growth of services in the center occurred after the basic human needs of the bulk of the population had been met. In this case the growth in services represents "the refined demands of people who were able to raise their incomes above the level of subsistence (more education, training, health, . . . "(92) In the periphery, however, the service sector represents unemployment, a parasitic attachment to the wealthy, and the displacement of the population from activities that provide the basic necessities of life. "The situation in the underdeveloped countries is very different. They are far removed from a condition of satisfying the basic necessities of their peoples. It does not signify an improvement of the efficiency of producing basic goods to permit the displacement of workers into the service sector."(93) Finally, we must point out that wages for many services, with the exception of the professions, are very low; this is due, in part, to abundant labor. Overall, the service sector does not really overcome the problem of unemployment and poverty. It represents the failure to effectively use a country's assets to the benefit of its people, a major portion of the population remains impoverished. Even during a time, 1940-53, when Chile's industry was expanding, the percentage of people employed in the services was growing more rapidly (65 percent) than those employed in the production of goods (18 percent).(94) We may now discuss some of the political aspects of the period under consideration.
Political Aspects
In light of the foregoing, peripheral economies were oriented toward the exterior in that mineral and agricultural products were exchanged for manufactured goods and food. Since there was little autonomous economic activity, the political parties that emerged had their economic basis in foreign exchange. These indigenous classes helped provide the political and economic link between the foreign power and the local economy. In certain cases, colonial rule for example, local governments were directly administered by colonial representatives, and local officials were a subservient part of a governmental apparatus directed from abroad. In other circumstances, as in Chile, the foreign power was less conspicuously a factor, though the political classes that emerged were oriented toward the outside. In general, these classes were composed of the "landowners, who dominated without opposition in the first period of life after independence, to which were added other groups, among which stand out the mineral impresarios and those of the commercial and financial sectors."(95) Although the interests of these classes did not always coincide, they were united in preserving their economic position through a common economic policy.
But, we insist, there were no fundamental antagonisms in the economic sphere. As groups, all were producers of primary products or of associated or subordinated services, all were more or less advocates of free trade for the same reason, their principle markets were outside the country, and further, from the outside could be found those goods which satisfied their normally refined tastes; they were not protectionistic for the simple reason that they had very little to protect.(96)
The policy of free trade in Chile, with a few exceptions, went virtually unchallenged. One notable exception was Jose Balmaceda (president 1886-91) who advocated taking control of the nitrates and national enterprises and using the surplus to foster autonomous industrial development.(97) In his words, "We must invest the surplus in productive works so that when the nitrate deposits are exhausted or lose their importance because of discoveries of new deposits or scientific progress, we shall have established a national industry and created with it and the state railways, the basis for new investment."(98) Balmaceda's program was not unlike that proposed by Allende in 1970, and met with a similar fate. He was overthrown in a brief civil war in which the opposition was financially assisted by the British nitrate owners.
Economic and Political Dependence and Vulnerability
The existence of an economy oriented toward the exterior and politically maintained through a conjunction of foreign and local interests implies that a peripheral economy lives or dies according to its fortunes in the international market. In many peripheral countries, and Chile is no exception, the foreign economic relation depends upon the export of a few primary mineral or agricultural products.(99) In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century much of Chile's export income was gained from nitrates, and copper has served in that role for much of this century. Since imports, manufacture, and even food, as well as state revenues, may well depend upon exports, decreases in the demand and price of these commodities can have drastic economic and political effects. Recessions in the center, new sources for the center's imports, technical developments that make certain commodities superfluous or new ones essential, are reflected in the erratic economic and political careers of Third World countries. The history of Chile since the mid-nineteenth century is one long chronicle of rapid spurts of economic recovery and growth punctuated by slowdowns or sudden collapses which were due to the waxing and waning of her mineral exports. Shortly after her integration into the world economy, Chile experienced the first of many external shocks. In 1857-61 and again 1878 there were economic crises. These were due to a combination of many factors, including declines in the prices of metal Chile exported (silver, copper, gold), and loss of revenues from wheat brought on by the opening up of lands in the North American midwest, Canada, and Australia.(100) The crisis of 1878 was the more severe. The effect of the milder 1857-61 crises was as follows:
At the end of August 1857, the contraction of money and credit had become so intense that commercial transactions were completely paralyzed in Valparaiso. The commercial crises had fatal repercussions for agriculture, mining, industry . . . it was necessary to reduce labor, abandon or postpone major construction or improvements that had been planned. There were many noisy bankruptcies. The price of rural property fell by 40 percent.(101)
Following the more severe crisis of 1878, the economy remained stagnant until Chile took possession of the Peruvian nitrate mines in 1882. Nitrate production expanded and generated some governmental income as well as related commercial activities. Throughout this period Chile's export base narrowed, becoming more and more dependent upon nitrates.(102) The ratio of exports to imports increased dramatically at the start of World War I, and then suddenly returned to prewar levels in 1918. At that time a process was discovered for synthesizing nitrates from the air, and the bottom fell out of the nitrate market. Funds from nitrates dropped from 110 million in 1918 to 40 million in the years 1921 and 1922.(103) The collapse of nitrates was followed by the rediscovery of copper. This resource fell at once into foreign hands, this time North American; but the development of this resource could scarcely take effect before the Great Depression delivered the coup de grace to the economy. Chile felt the impending crisis as early as 1925. In that year her exports decreased by almost 90 percent.(104) Within a brief period, the number of people working in the mines was reduced by 65 percent, the amount of capital flowing into the country as investment virtually disappeared, and imports diminished, including imports of capital goods.(105) Chile, cut off from the center by the depression and the war was forced to industrialize, and did so, At war's end manufacture, and then capital, flowed once more into Chile. We will investigate these new developments, but the fact of dependence and economic vulnerability was restored, and to this day Chile is at the mercy of an external market. Furthermore, her economic dependence and instability is coupled with political dependence and instability (2.5). The power of the rural oligarchy and lack of industry meant that state revenues were collected from exports. In 1895, for example, exports comprised 95.1 percent of state revenues, in 1929 it was 67 percent, and in 1954 it was 52 percent.(106) The collapse of nitrate prices in 1918 implied a sudden decrease in state revenues, and ushered in a period of political instability which continued until the depression. Even subsequent to World War II, when the development of industry lessened Chile's dependence upon export revenues, government programs and the economic development would at times hit the wall of a drop in copper prices. The price of economic integration around a few basic commodities is periodic chaos, economic uncertainty, and political instability. Pinto sums it up as follows:
In sum, the entire economic body is integrated and dependent to a high degree on the establishment of these primary materials. Well then, recognizing this orientation, we must consider that a normal economic process is threatened by fluctuations as pronounced as those cited in a report by the United Nations, that export prices change about 23 percent from one year to the next. It would be as if an employee or worker found himself exposed from one night to the following morning and continually to declines in his wages of this magnitude . . . ups and downs of this degree are profoundly disturbing and conspire against one of the primordial prerequisites of progressive economic evolution: a certain level of stability.(107)
Given that a stable economic basis is a prerequisite for a viable social life (2.5), the erratic fortunes of peripheral countries on the world market has not only played havoc with their economic life, but has also made social and political life problematical at best. We shall investigate this in succeeding sections.
Introduction to the Modern Period
The depression and war years, 1930-45, brought significant changes to Chile's economy and for the whole of the Third World. The center's preoccupation with the war effort was a factor in the independence of many colonial nations, and in the case of Chile, it meant that Chile no longer could import capital, manufactured goods, food, and capital goods at previous levels. As a result Chile, as did other Latin American nations, was forced to industrialize, and did so.(108) Between 1930 and 1945 industrial production grew by 125 percent.(109) The composition of the economy changed. The percentages devoted to agriculture and mineral exports dropped, while services and industry gained. Between 1929 and 1950, national income from minerals dropped from 32.5 to 11.9 percent, agriculture from 19.2 to 16.7 percent, while industry grew from 13.8 percent to 21.7 percent, and the services from 39.6 to 49.2 percent.(110) As a result of these changes the composition of the body politic was transformed as well. An urban proletariat emerged, along with a middle class whose basis was in the services as well as state financed jobs. Leftist political parties, socialist and communist, were strengthened, and the political process became much more complicated. Since the late nineteenth century a limited democracy had emerged in Chile, although the landowners and the commercial liberal party dominated Chile's political landscape. The drop in the price of nitrates after World War One occasioned a period of political instability which lasted until the depression. Following periods of dictatorial rule in the twenties, the economy and government floundered through 1930-32 with numerous juntas and short term presidents. In 1932 political stability was restored, a president was elected, and governments were democratically elected until the fall of Allende in 1973. The emergence of new social classes greatly complicated the democratic process. Complex struggles issued in shifting coalitions in which no political faction could conclusively gain the upper hand, although the power of the old regime, the landowners and the commercial class, was never really broken.(111) As a result, no clear economic policy emerged. On the whole, however, economic developments can be separated into two stages. First, a period of inward development, 1930-1955, followed by a time of transition, and then a period of reintegration into the world capitalist market.(112) We will begin with the economic developments that occurred with the depression and war, and conclude by characterizing aspects of the final period.
The Depression and War Years
During the depression and war, the state became a significant force promoting economic growth in Chile. Partly by necessity, and party by design, industry emerged and was strengthened by state intervention. Tariffs were erected to protect fledgling industries, and the government itself operated many of these industries and limited the flow of imports so that import substitution would occur.(113) Even after the war and into the sixties the state continued to play a prominent role in economic development.(114) Chile was also able to obtain a larger share of the revenues flowing from the export sector. Copper became a very important export item during the war. National participation in copper revenues increased from 22 percent in 1928 to 84 percent in 1952.(115) The funds from exports were then channeled by the state into investment and internal development. A growing class of people became dependent upon state funds for their livelihood. The size of the economic pie increased, and efforts were made by all the contending parties to increase their share. The large landowners were able to defeat any measure designed to tax their properties or distribute their holdings for greater productive use. Agricultural production actually declined, more foodstuffs were imported, including foods that could be grown in Chile.(116) The poor use of agricultural lands continued after the war as well. In the sixties Chile was having to import around 200 million dollars worth of food products annually, much of it products that could be grown locally.(117) The result was an increase in the price of basic foodstuffs. This penalized the poorer classes and workers, whose position was further undermined by tax policies that favored the wealthy.(118) Given an increase in internal production, real wages rose from 1940 to 1953 by 40 percent. This increase was not, however, equally distributed among the population. The workers and those in the poorest services increased their wages by seven percent, white collar wages increased by 46 percent, while the wealthy sector, those who lived off their property and investments, increased their real revenues by 60 percent.(119) Furthermore, the minor increase in real wages for the poorer sectors was offset by disproportionate increases in food and housing prices, with the result that the great mass of the population did not benefit in any substantial way from the nation's economic progress. In Pinto's words:
The great mass of the population has their standard of living determined by the availability of certain basic goods, especially food and housing. Neither the one nor the other has become more available; on the contrary, these necessities have fallen behind other goods in their being accessible for public use. . . . In the failure to expand the availability of basic goods is to be found the great flaw, not only of economic policy, but social as well.(120)
The result of the foregoing was increased political conflict. The left pushed for land reform and the socialization of industry in order to channel greater sums into wages and investment rather than into consumption by the wealthy. Excess consumption by the wealthy had come to represent a sizable portion of the country's surplus.(121) The middle class found itself particularly vulnerable. Its economic base lay primarily in the services or state jobs, and these were dependent upon the vagaries of the external market. Any fall in copper prices decreased state revenues, and since an important segment of the population was dependent upon state wages, the government was forced either to print money, or tax the wealthy, and the former inflationary course was frequently adopted.(122) By the middle sixties Chile came to have one of the highest inflation rates in the world.(123) One consequence of uncontrolled inflation was political instability as wages fell against prices. In 1952, Carlos Ibanez was elected president on a populist program, but "was forced out of his populist stance by the arrival of hyper-inflation: the cost of living level rose by 71 percent in 1954 and 84 percent in 1955. The chief cause was probably the decline in Chilean copper revenues following the end of the Korean War."(124) Ibanez brought the situation under control through austerity measures entailing a cut in wages by the salaried classes which in turn intensified popular resistance. Ibanez's term ended in 1958, and he was succeeded by a president on the right, Jorge Alessandri, who adopted a policy of free enterprise, less state intervention, and an open door policy with respect to foreign capital and manufactured goods. His policy was continued, with some modifications, by Eduardo Frei, 1964-70. As a result Chile, together with Latin America as a whole, was reintegrated into the expanding post-war capitalist market, and we shall conclude our economic discussion by characterizing this integration.
Post-War Integration
By the end of the war the United States had emerged as the capitalist world's foremost economic and political power. Since expenditures on armaments no longer drained off the center's surplus, vast sums accumulated and found a partial outlet in peripheral economies. North American investments in Latin America went from 4.6 billion dollars in 1950 to 13 billion dollars in 1968, and as of that date represented 59 percent of all foreign investment in Latin America.(125) In Chile, foreign investments for a similar period, 1950-67, amounted to 257 million dollars in direct investments, and 1.718 billion dollars in loans, most of which, about 80 percent in the late sixties, was used by foreign companies operating in Chile.(126) Partly because of the development of industry in Latin America during the War, together with an increased demand for manufactured goods within Latin American countries, as well as tariffs limiting certain types of manufacturing imports, these new capital flows took a form that differed from the form taken prior to the war. In general, a significant percentage of the capital was invested by multinational corporations who purchased or created manufacturing industries within the periphery itself. In Latin America, these local industries were directed toward the local market.(127) In Chile, most of the capital flowed once again into the export enclave, although the fastest growing form of foreign investment was in manufacturing and commercial activities. In the sixties, for example, mining investment in Chile remained roughly constant, while commercial and manufacturing investment tripled.(128) In Latin America as a whole, the growth of investment in manufacturing was about double what it was in other sectors.(129) Furthermore, most of the investment in Latin America was carried out by a relatively few big North American firms.(130) As a result of these investments, Latin American industry became in part, and in certain sectors totally, dominated by foreign capital.(131) Consequently, Chile lost control of her mineral production, with North American firms holding most of the foreign owned shares.(132) Furthermore, foreign capital, being stronger, invaded and consolidated a number of Chilean firms, which led to the centralization and concentration of Chile's economy under monopolistic control from abroad. For example, the Chilean car industry, which consisted of 24 companies in 1962 was reduced to 12 by 1969, of which seven were controlled from abroad, four being subsidiaries of large foreign companies.(133) Similar results occurred in other sectors of the economy, such as petrochemicals, electronics, textiles, and the food industry.
A major result of the foregoing capital penetration is that Chile lost a significant portion of her economic surplus. During the depression and war the profits from Chile's industrial growth, and this is true of Latin America's industry, were reinvested in the native countries themselves. The result was industrial growth throughout the region. After the war, this surplus was shipped abroad in the form of profits, service on the debt, and royalties. The corporations that invested in Latin America did so only under agreements that provided the means of remitting their profits. And these profits were large in comparison to the profits obtained in the center itself. For the periphery as a whole, Amin estimates that profits have averaged around 20-25 percent per year.(134) United State's investments in Latin America returned substantial dividends as well. In the five year period from 1961-1965, for example, United States firms invested 149 million dollars in Latin America, and received in return 978 million dollars, for a net gain of 829 million dollars.(135) This large differential is due to the fact that profits abroad were made on investment that came from a number of sources: new investment from parent companies in the United States (this composes the 149 million), old profits made in the periphery and reinvested on the spot, capital borrowed locally, and royalties on technologies. In the years 1963-65, only nine percent of North American investment in Latin America actually came from the United States; the remainder, 93 percent, was local capital and profits already captured and utilized locally by North American firms.(136) In Chile, in the years 1950-67, there was a net inflow of 257 million dollars in direct investment, and from this, 1.056 billion dollars was returned to the center in profits and dividends. With respect to foreign loans in the same period, Chile had received 1.718 billion dollars in loans, had paid back 1.406 billion dollars in amortizations and interests, and still owed 2.1 billion dollars on the debt itself.(137) Within a very short time, the original investment is returned, and then far more. For example, if the rate of profit varies between 15 and 20 percent, in four to five years the original investment is returned, and subsequently, the host country ends up exporting capital. The fact that foreign capital can use local capital to increase profits only speeds up the process. Furthermore, in Chile, the state enhanced the profitability of foreign firms by paying for the development of the nation's infrastructure, and leaving it to private capital to invest in the most profitable enterprises.(138) There is however, a limit to this process, and it is reached rather quickly. The limit is set by the balance of payments.
North American banks and corporations invest in and lend to Latin American countries with the aim of making profits, and these profits are remitted in dollars under agreements worked out with the host country. The net result of capital investment in Lain America was a return capital flow that quickly exceeded the original investment. In the years 1950-69, the profits returned to North American firms was 6.7 billion dollars more than their direct investments.(139) Since the amount of dollars flowing out exceeds the flow coming in, dollars must flow into Latin America from other sources. In general, the industries established in Latin America were to meet local needs, and therefore the dollars must come from a host country's traditional exports, her mineral and agricultural wealth, rather than from new exported manufacture.(140)
. . . what interests us to emphasize here is that the income transferred (or capable of transfer) because of service on foreign capital does not have a counterweight of foreign earnings created by the effect of these investments, precisely because the bulk of those investments are principally or exclusively directed toward activities linked to the internal market. Because of that, additional pressures arise on the balance of payments which we will discuss shortly.(141)
As the outflow of profits increased, foreign exchange became progressively scarce. From 1952 to 1967, service on foreign capital grew from 18.5 percent of Latin American exports to 37 percent.(142) With respect to Chile, in 1950 capital exports from profits and loans amounted to only 7.6 percent of foreign earnings, by 1963 it had grown to 47.8, and by 1965 it exceeded 50 percent of foreign earnings.(143) Furthermore, it is to be remembered that Chile's principle export earnings were given by the mining enclave; in the mid-sixties the mining enclave supplied 84.5 percent of Chile's foreign earnings.(144) The result of the foregoing was that Latin America began to suffer a balance of payments crisis, exacerbated by the usual vulnerability of her exports to swings in commodity prices. In order to gain foreign currency, it is necessary to increase exports versus imports. This is often accomplished by a devaluation of the currency, which makes imports more expensive and exports cheaper. State salaries are frozen with respect to inflation; crucial imports, such as food and gasoline, receive lower state subsidies and thereby increase in price. The terms of these measures are often determined in large part by the center's lending institutions. The population suffers. Furthermore, the economy begins to stagnate as demand decreases through lower wages, and crucial imports, such as industrial machinery, become scarce. Given its economic integration with the outside, reduced imports means reduced economic activity, and this affects the whole of the economy. In this sense, the availability of foreign exchange sets the outer limit of industrial growth, with the result that growth can occur only if exports can outrun the need for foreign capital, which in turn depends upon the needs of the center for a country's primary products. The power of exports, however, to drive the economy forward becomes increasingly limited in a time of capital outflow, since service on foreign capital demands increased percentages of export earnings. The resultant blind alley has been expressed as follows:
Here exists the known aggravation of being supported by exports based upon a single primary product under the conditions of a highly monopolized market in which, under this modality, one can attempt only slightly to adjust the "strait jacket." . . . In a few words, it does not appear possible for the functioning of the internal capitalistic structure to escape, except occasionally, the limit fixed for it by the availability of foreign earnings.(145)
In short, the post-war penetration of foreign capital robbed the periphery of a portion of the surplus which had been contributing to its internal growth. The surplus left the country through profits and service on the foreign debt, and tangibly, the lost surplus appeared as an outward flow of agricultural and mineral products without an equal flow of material goods from the center. Further, the reintegration into the international market, once again subjected Latin American countries to the variations of the external market. These conditions still hold in Latin America.(146)
Effects of Post-War Integration
It is difficult to discover with any precision the effect on living standards of Latin America's post war reintegration into the center's economy. Frank claims that real income and food consumption for Latin Americans has declined throughout the twentieth century.(147) Cardoso and Faletto report that the living standards of the marginal masses and workers suffer under the economic conditions created by foreign capital.(148) With respect to Chile, industry became progressively capital intensive, and although industrial wages rose slightly in the sixties,(149) the overall effect was that the "immense majority of the workers and those of middle income had very few opportunities for productive work, and received a reduced proportion of low incomes which created and did not find solutions to their fundamental problems."(150) With respect to Latin America as a whole, United Nations statistics reveal that gross internal production more than doubled, 2.4, on a per capita basis between 1950 and 1969, and this compares with 6.4 for the socialist countries, and 3.5 for the central capitalist countries.(151) It is difficult to see how significant this is for Latin America, since increased production may not translate into increased distribution of essential goods and services for the bulk of the population. What does seem clear, is that Latin America has progressively fallen behind the center and the socialist countries, and that major portions of its population live in poverty. We will have to leave this matter of living standards for the moment, and return to it later when we consider the matter from a wider perspective.
Finally, we will conclude this section with two observations on the reintegration of Latin America into the world capitalist economy. In short, Latin America's reintegration brought increased political and economic dependence upon and domination by the center, particularly the United States.(152) There was also a shift in the internal political structure of Latin American countries as well. In general, the period of independent development occasioned by the depression has been characterized by Cardoso and Faletto as being a period of nationalist and populist development. During this period various political groupings, landowners, urban middle and industrial sectors, national bourgeoisie, workers, and rural and urban masses gained influences and political significance.(153) The penetration of capital and economic integration into the center shifted the structures of political alliances and possibilities. Significant economic decisions came to be dictated by the external world market or international lending institutions, and an international bourgeoisie emerged that associated itself with the local industrial bourgeoisie. The increased expectations brought about by internal development were frustrated by post war stagnations, and pressure from below forced countries to adopt more authoritarian measures to hold their populations in check. As a result there emerged a fusion of several sectors--the national bourgeoisie and the state, the multinational corporation, and the army.
The democratic-representative regime, which in one form or another survived under the developmentalist state and under the populist policy of the initial phase of industrial expansion, is converted into the authoritarian-corporative regime through rebellions in which large national organizations like the army and the public bureaucracy (rather than the national and internationalized bourgeoisie) take action and reorganize. Of course, because the structural system that limits the possible action of these groups has not changed, the internationalized bourgeoisie continues to be the basis of the system of domination.(154)
The increased significance of the military was fortified by United States policy of military training and assistance. Cardoso and Faletto describe the success of this policy as follows:
It must be recognized that, considering its goals and without passing judgment on the means employed ("destabilization," "dirty conspiracy" support of regressive governments, etc.), the main objectives of American policy in the region have been obtained. The cost of this success may be measured by the fact that there were few situations in Latin America in which regimes guaranteeing some public freedom survived, and even fewer regimes that constantly tried to support development policies beneficial to the welfare of the majority.(155)
Secondly, there is the fact of increased economic dependence. Although local manufacture was contributing a greater share of public consumption, much of the economy was dependent upon foreign imports. Manufacturing firms, as well as the mining sector, became dependent upon the center for such things as their heavy machinery, spare parts, advanced technology, and management. The increasing debt meant that countries could not function without new loans, and local financial institutions were integrated into the center's lending institutions. Finally, in the case of Chile as well as other Latin American countries, the center even supplied a number of important foodstuffs. As a result, Latin America finds it difficult to follow an independent economic course without inviting economic chaos. Both of these forms of dependence can be seen in the case of Chile. Governments were democratically elected in Chile from the mid 1930's until the election of Salvador Allende in 1970. Much of Allende's electoral success was based upon the failure of his predecessors to solve the country's economic problems. The preceding two governments had welcomed foreign investment, and after initial upswings, the economy had stagnated while wages fell against inflation.(156) Allende's party was elected with a program of "putting an end to the power of national and foreign monopolistic capital and of latifundism in order to begin the construction of socialism."(157) Allende nationalized the mines, began to nationalize foreign industry, and started to carry out a vigorous agrarian reform. The hope had been to make a peaceful transition to socialism. Allende's attempt toward autonomous development resulted in an American blockade, the freezing of credit from major lending institutions, lobbying on the part of the mining interests to prevent sales of Chilean copper to Europe, and efforts--the CIA, foreign firms, the U.S. trained military, and the national bourgeoisie--to bring down the government in a military coup.(158) The blockade virtually strangled the economy, copper prices happened to drop, chaos reigned, Allende's program was pronounced a shambles, the government was dispersed, and Allende murdered. Chile returned to the reign of laissez-faire economics and this policy held sway until the recent recession (1980-83), which, together with a further drop in copper prices, led to the abandonment of this policy. Since the fall of Allende, 1973, Chile has been governed by a military dictatorship. Forty years of democratic government came to an end; Chile has suffered the longest period of one-man dictatorship since the mid-nineteenth century. In short, Chile could economically reward only a small segment of the population, and these economic conditions were eventually incompatible with democratic political freedom. Democracy allowed the election of candidates who attempted to widen the economic base, and this led to the development of the dictatorship as the only means of slamming the lid on popular pressure from below while enabling local and foreign interests to appropriate the surplus.
Primitive Accumulation
Given the center's overwhelming military superiority, and in light of (2.15), (3.4), (3.5), and (4.10), we would expect the center's relations with the periphery to involve substantial transfers of wealth from periphery to center. Amin calls this phenomenon "primitive accumulation," and an analysis of this phenomenon lies at the heart of the Marxist critique of relations between center and periphery.(159) In essence, the center, in every epoch of its relations with the periphery, has appropriated a significant portion of the periphery's surplus. The forms in which the surplus has been accumulated have changed, but the phenomenon itself has remained constant. In the mercantilist period, the era of initial European expansion, the periphery's surplus was captured through such means as plunder, trading companies, and mines and plantations using slave or enforced labor.(160) This period evolved into the middle or classical period of capitalist development. Between the initial mercantilist and classical phases there was what Amin calls a pause in the center's relations with the periphery as the center developed internally making the transition into a finished industrial form.(161) In the middle period of classical capitalism, the workers consumed a fraction of what they produced, and part of the excess was shipped abroad where it aided in the destruction of local manufacture and the capture of the agricultural and mineral outputs of peripheral nations. The fact that the center's manufacture supplied the periphery, meant that the periphery's surplus appeared as mineral or agricultural wealth. The periphery was capitalized, integrated into the world capitalist market, and its surplus, the agricultural and mineral output, was shipped abroad. This surplus was virtually expropriated without recompense, mined or produced by forced or poorly paid labor, and only a fraction of the value remained in the country. Chile's nitrates are a case in point. This form of primitive accumulation was established through events of a social historical nature. The center's imperialism and willing or unwilling acquiescence by peripheral nations provided the basis for the economic exploitation. As the monopoly period emerged, a new form of primitive appropriation developed, and this form has remained in force until the present day. This form is termed "unequal exchange" and stems from the fact that the rewards of labor are less in the periphery than in the center. After 1880, wages throughout the center rose, in part because competition among companies diminished, and in part, from political factors such as the legalization of unions (not without a struggle), minimum wage, and social legislation.(162) By contrast, workers in the periphery have lacked the political power to better their economic lot. That is, workers in the periphery, miners, rural laborers, and of late, industrial workers, earn far less than their counterparts in the center. As a result, the goods they produce for export to the center tend to become cheaper in relation to the center's goods as shipped to the periphery. The net effect is that the flow of goods rewards the center over against the periphery, since work in the center captures a greater portion of the total flow. This can be seen in the terms of trade. With some variations, there has been, from 1880 until the present, a worsening of the terms of trade between center and periphery.(163) In Chile, for example, the terms of trade worsened by 40 percent between 1870 and 1946,(164) and after the war, the terms of trade for Latin America as a whole deteriorated by 23 percent.(165) This implies that doubling Latin American exports since the war would only increase her imports by 54 percent. It has been estimated that the loss to Latin America, because of the worsening of the terms of trade between 1953 and 1968, reached approximately 3.4 billion dollars annually.(166) Although it is difficult to estimate, the decrease in terms of trade for Latin America would indicate that her exports today must be between two or three times their volume of 1880 to obtain the same amount of imports. The same phenomenon can be approached in another fashion by asking what would happen if the rewards of labor in the periphery were equal to those in the center. Samir Amin makes these calculations for 1966, a year in which the periphery's exports were valued at about 35 billion dollars.(167) Of this 35 billion, three-fourths or 26 billion, was produced by modern sectors with equal productivity to their counterparts in the center. Had this 26 billion been produced by workers with wages equal to the center's wages its value would have been 34 billion. About 8 billion is gained by the center. Had the entire 35 billion in exports been produced by workers of equal wage and productivity to those in the center, their value would have been about 57 billion. Approximately 22 billion is gained by the center. It is to be remembered however, that the fact of poor productivity for one-fourth of the periphery's output is itself the product of internal and external social historical factors, the loss of the periphery's surplus being a significant factor. The gain of 22 billion does not represent a major gain by the center, but it is significant in terms of the periphery, amounting to about 15 percent of its total product and a much higher percentage of its surplus.
The hidden transfer of value due to unequal exchange is thus around 15 percent of this product; this is far from negligible in relative terms, and is alone sufficient to account for the blocking of growth of the periphery and the increasing gap between it and the center. The contribution that this transfer constitutes is not negligible, either, seen from the standpoint of the center which benefits from it, since it comes to about 1.5 percent of the center's product. This is not the main thing, however, from the standpoint of the center: what matters is that this transfer is vital for the giant firms that are its direct beneficiaries.(168)
This form of primitive accumulation is made possible by, among other things, the fact that labor is not mobile across political boundaries, the abundance of peripheral labor because of the social historical factors we have previously described, and the fact that efforts by the working class to better their economic lot (higher wages, land reform, control of the mineral enclave) have met with political repression. Finally, we have already discussed the third form of primitive accumulation; that is, capital flows into the periphery result in even greater capital flows into the center. The capital enters the periphery, and then in proportion to such factors as its size, interest rates, rate of profit, it generates a net reverse flow of goods from periphery to center. It also intensifies the phenomenon of unequal exchange since balance of payments problems often result in currency devaluations and austerity measures which lower real wages.(169) It is, of course, difficult to estimate the size of the surplus appropriated by the center; we may, perhaps, gain a glimpse of it in the case of Chile. In 1963, Chile, by virtue of 400 years of accumulation, had a net commercial value of about 9 billion dollars. This figure represents Chile's combined existent assets and does not count her as yet unexploited assets. In the previous fifty years, 1913-1963, the copper companies alone, to say nothing of nitrates and agricultural products, shipped out about 3.95 billion on an investment of about .488 billion. Of this .488 billion, only a small fraction entered Chile from abroad, the remainder being reinvestment of profits made in Chile.(170) In other words, the value of the copper that left Chile in fifty years was almost equal to one-half of Chile's combined assets in 1963. All of the foregoing may help to make sense out of the fact that the gap between periphery and center has widened, and shows no sign of closing. Pinto describes it as the marginalization and dependence of Latin America. Latin America has become marginalized in the sense that its per capita production and economic growth is falling further and further behind that of the center.(171) Amin reports the same phenomenon for the periphery as a whole.(172)
The result of primitive accumulation has been two-fold: first, the appropriation of the periphery's surplus prevents it from using that surplus to develop and direct its own economic destiny; and secondly, the economic/social system that was formed has historically routed the means of life from periphery to center, with only a modicum reserved for the bulk of the periphery's population. In exchange, there has been a smaller reverse flow of manufacture and luxury items that have partially provided for the marginal existence of the many, and luxury for a few. In 1965 the average per capita annual income in the periphery as a whole was 160 dollars, and for Latin America, 370 dollars.(173) Keeping in mind that income in Latin America is poorly distributed, this implies that Latin Americans are poor; they are very poor.(174) Income in the center is higher, far higher. This great disparity indicates that the flow of goods throughout the West benefits some and excludes others. This flow of goods is a social/historical statement (2.3). Many of the goods that are consumed and wasted by the center arrived by routes that involved the periphery. These objects are mute witness to a social history. This social history was initiated, is maintained, and is directed by social historical events, and given the terrible disparity, it reflects the fact of broken covenant, the reality of domination, exploitation, and wholesale indifference. The flow expresses the fact of the periphery's labor and its servitude (2.11), and the willingness of consumers in the center to profit by the periphery's labor. By the center's standards, the benefits derived from the periphery's labor and products, may not be very significant, certainly it is less than the center expends on luxury and waste. Nevertheless, what is luxury for some is survival for others, and the surplus appropriated by the center constitutes that absolutely crucial increment needed to sustain and enhance life in the periphery. These miserable conditions reflect the rule of Mammon in human affairs. They are the product of two factors, economic domination backed up by political power, and this carried out by a convergence of foreign and domestic interests.(175) Perhaps, our conclusions are amiss at this point. But, if we are to remain true to a Barthian perspective, these miserable conditions are the result of sin, sin understood as broken covenant among peoples. I can seen no other significant political or economic forces except the governments and ruling parties of the periphery, and they in relationship to the center's political and economic interests. If there were no commercial and political relation between center and periphery, then it could be said that the center has little to do with events in the periphery. But it is obvious to all that there have been significant economic and political interactions between center and periphery for several centuries. The only other alternative view is that the center has been a "blessing" to the periphery. This is, of course, logically possible. It would, however, be incredible from a Barthian perspective to believe that the center, belonging to the outer sphere of the nations and governed by an ideology that idolizes profits, could avoid breaking covenant with the periphery. There is little doubt that the center has made some contributions in the technical sphere of economic life. But Eden was not lost through technical inadequacy. Rather, technical life depends upon covenant, (2.3), and economic misery implies a broken covenant, (2.7). We may conclude that the covenant has indeed been broken in this case. We have documented this rupture, and seen it as the rule of Mammon in human affairs. The center has made capital its god, and followed its little idol to its appointed end--the laying waste of weaker nations and persons. Barth was well aware of this idol, and he was aware of the socialist critique of capitalism. We may conclude this section with a passage from Barth, a passage that sums up a number of our themes:
Money is a flexible but powerful instrument which, supposedly handled by man, in reality follows its own law. In a thousand ways it can establish some opinions and even convictions and suppress others. It can also create brutal facts. It can cause the market to rise and then to fall again. It can arrest the crisis and cause another. It can serve peace yet pursue cold war even in the midst of peace. It can make ready for bloody war and finally bring it about. It can make provisional paradise here and the corresponding provisional hell there. It does not have to do all these things, but it can. It can and it does: not money as such, but the money that man thinks he possess, although in truth it possess him, and it does so because he wants to have it without God and thus creates a vacuum in which this intrinsically harmless but useful fiction becomes an absolutist demon, and man himself can only be its football and its slave.(176)
We may conclude this section by summarizing the foregoing outer history in terms derived from the inner history of the covenant. By (2.15), (3.4), and (3.8), the fundamental sinful drive that leads to economic suffering is the desire to accumulate land and wealth. This drive is carried out through social historical events of encounter between peoples, and these events determine the shape of any given economic system (2.3). These events take many forms, and we have narrated some of the events that have contributed to the economic deprivation found throughout the periphery. We have described the initial European conquest, the wars and insurrections that accompanied the penetration of capital at the turn of this century, the political domination required to expropriate Indian and church lands in Latin America, the Roosevelt Corollary and interventions by the United States to preserve its economic interests, the power of the landed class in Chile to preserve their estates and their alliances with the commercial/financial class to preserve free trade and access to luxury imports, the crushing of efforts to redistribute the wealth in favor of the oppressed as in the case of Allende and Balmaceda, and the military and political ties between the United States and peripheral countries. These social historical events enabled certain classes and nations to preserve their wealth, land, and power. From the perspective of the covenant, the results of the drive to acquire land and wealth are starvation, dispossession, exploitation, lawlessness, and murder, (3.4) and (3.5). As expected, these results did occur and we have documented this as well. The consolidation of agricultural lands and the destruction of local manufacture due to the center's lust for profits and wealth from foreign markets led to a dispossessed rural mass with limited economic resources. The penetration of capital in the drive for greater accumulation after 1880 led to a frenzy of murder, rebellion, and war, as well as the loss by peripheral countries of their export systems and elements of their internal economies. The fact of foreign ownership and control meant that peripheral countries were robbed of their mineral and agricultural wealth, and this contributed to their dispossession and hunger. Furthermore, dispossession, in the form of landlessness or joblessness, left people vulnerable to exploitation, and they were exploited as rural laborers or in the swollen services where their servitude contributed to the extravagance of the wealthy classes. After World War II, the influx of foreign capital soon gave way to a much greater reverse flow, and this was counterbalanced by austerity measures and an increase of exports over imports which diminished living standards. Simultaneously, the integration of the peripheral countries into an external market, and their dependence upon a few major export items, subjected them to the chaos of the international market which battered their economies and their peoples with its rapid and unexpected oscillations. And throughout this process, and even now, the results of the drive for wealth and land lead to continual dispossession and starvation, as the periphery's surplus in its varied forms is drained away to be consumed by an indifferent people who scarcely realize that their luxury is another's survival. All these phenomena are examples of chaos, the sorts of chaos warded off by God in his ordering of creation through the divine Word. The chaos that once hung over creation has invaded God's good earth (2.7). The covenant has been broken and chaos has gone amuck, to the detriment of God's people and the ruin of their economic well-being.
The foregoing assessment is a faith statement. It has its basis in revelation, in the covenant. According to Barth's understanding of covenant and economic life, economic misery has its basis in sin (2.7). This sin is not half way, nor is it only the property of others, but total and universal (3.8). The existence of this sin as occurring in specific historical events is only known by grace in faith, in the event of the Word (3.8). Apart from the Word there will be no lack of countering opinions, and they will be backed up by weighty evidence and respected authority. They all amount to the same thing--that a given condition requires little or no repentance, that it has its basis in the evil of others or in nature, or that a given nation or class is sincerely and actually acting in the best interests of the oppressed, and above all, that things will improve without any loss of wealth or power on the part of those who benefit from the economic order. These opinions are acts of evasion. They are sin at the intellectual level, and they provide the ideological structure by which nations justify their acquisitive policies and order their national life (4.7). They are not however, the state's true norm (4.3), and therefore they cannot be accepted by the church, nor by Christians as they act in the political realm.
Conclusions
Our purpose in this section is to draw some conclusions as to how governments may act responsibly to relieve the economic suffering we have just described. Before drawing these conclusions, we wish to note some of the limits of this study. Our thesis has been that economic life exists in the context of social history. We have not presented an analysis of social life from a Barthian perspective, nor have we investigated the technical aspects of economic life in any detail. Our aim has been to assess the relations between these two realms, not to investigate directly the realms themselves. With respect to political affairs, we have not, for example, discussed strategies for political change, or compared various political alternatives, or investigated norms for political life. We did investigate the nature of political responsibility for economic life, and demonstrated that it would require certain types of economic and political changes. We did not discuss, however, such issues as to whether or not these changes can best be effected through such political forms as democratic capitalism, socialism, communism, or mixed economies. We cannot, therefore, comment upon these matters in detail. Nevertheless, our study was definite enough to reach some conclusions, and they do have content even in respect to forms of political life. Clearly, to reach concrete conclusions with respect to political and economic affairs, conclusions that actually say something about real life, is to place oneself in the almost certain position of being mistaken. It is, however, preferable to take that risk, rather than saying or doing nothing at all. In Barth's words, "Better something doubtful or over bold and therefore in need of correction and forgiveness, than nothing at all!"(177)
Finally, to whom are we addressing ourselves as we make these suggestions? We address ourselves to the church. We do not directly address ourselves to the state. Our analysis has been theological. Barth does not suggest that we offer Christian programs to the state, nor should we hand them theological treatises to justify such programs. The suggestions we present are guidelines by which the church may work in and analyze political and economic affairs. The state will not fully implement our suggestions, but they give direction for the church's service to the state. We may now present some conclusions.
We may begin with the fact that economic deprivation and physical suffering is a daily reality for millions of Latin Americans. We start with that fact (3.6). Furthermore, this condition is not simply a passing phenomenon. Latin America has been integrated into the international capitalist system for over a century. The present order has had sufficient time to prove its validity, or its worthlessness.(178) Something is amiss, and it is not a superficial evil, but fundamental, wide-spread, persistent. We have located the source of the problem in social historical relations. Because of internal and external oppression, peripheral nations cannot employ their surplus to the benefit of their populations. Will this be changed? By (3.6) and (3.8), God is bringing the old order to an end and creating a new world in the midst of the old, and his actions have special relevance to the poor and oppressed. This is, of course, a faith statement. It can be applied to all socioeconomic systems as all are being transformed by God's grace. Yet it has a special reference. Among the nations of the world, the periphery has been exploited for centuries--they are the poor and oppressed. Their misery will come to and end. What do we mean by this? Given the limitation of the present era, the complete relief of all suffering awaits the eschatological age. Nevertheless, God works even now to bring forth his Kingdom in a real though fleeting way (4.8). Therefore, the revolution of God is a Word of grace and command for the present moment, and above all, it is a command to act in behalf of the marginated peoples whose condition we have just described. We must now speak more concretely of the direction of God's grace, and the nature of this command.(179) First, we may speak of God's grace as it occurs in the outer sphere of the nations.
According to Barth, the outer sphere of the nations is in God's hands, and he works in it through the covenant (4.3) and (4.4). This implies that he is effecting reconciliation, and that this reconciliation involves political and economic changes. Within the outer sphere, these transformations are not effected through the preaching of the gospel and repentance, as that applies to the church, but through law backed up by force. By virtue of this law and force, relative justice, peace, and economic well-being may occur. By law we cannot mean an eternal law, but law as dynamic and historical to the degree that it remotely reflects covenant law (1.9). We have characterized the present order as lawless. Certainly laws exist, but they do not function to create relative peace and physical well-being, but rather, strife and economic want. A new order, based in new laws, and created and backed up through force must emerge. Within the outer sphere, God works to create this new order. He always works through crucifixion and resurrection, the ending of the old, the creation of the new (3.8). Openings will appear in history, and they may be seized as they emerge. These openings may be recognized in that they will reflect transfers of power and assets in ways that remotely reflect the covenant. We may now speak of these transfers by indicating the sorts of changes our study envisions, beginning with economic transfers.
The economic exchanges must involve exchanges of wealth and control over economic assets in the direction given by the covenant. In short order: the foreign debt needs to be repudiated or cancelled, foreign ownership of production, lands, and mines, needs to be greatly diminished or ended, Latin American lands need to be better used, and internal ownership and control of productive facilities needs to be subject to social control or socially owned. A major objective of these changes is to allow nations to direct their surplus, and to provide work for their populations (2.11). All of these suggestions represent transfers of wealth and economic power away from the center to the periphery, and within the periphery, from the wealthy and powerful to the weaker and dispossessed (2.3) and (3.4). We may now discuss these changes in greater detail.
The economic changes we have recommended can occur only through events which transform the social historical base of economic life (2.3). We need to discuss two sets of social relations, those between center and periphery and internal political relations within the periphery itself. We shall begin with relations between center and periphery, especially the United States and Latin America.
Since all nations in origin and goal belong to the one great people of God (4.2), the direction of political relations needs to be toward international unity and cooperation. In the present era, however, the one great community as been broken. We have described the broken social and economic relations that exist between center and periphery, and between the United States and Latin America. The economic and political aspects of this sin can be only overcome through transformed political relations whose direction and basis is Jesus Christ, (2.3) and (3.2). In Jesus Christ, reconciliation involved an exchange, a movement in which the one who was strong became weak for the sake of others that they might become strong. In the outer sphere of the nations, this movement appears as an increase in political dependence and autonomy on the part of weaker nations vis-a-vis the stronger nations. A change of this sort will set the stage for true international cooperation in economic and political affairs. Until this occurs, the weaker nations of Latin America will not be able to exert their will in international affairs, and in particular, they will not be able to defend their economic interests. Therefore, the Latin American nations must free themselves from coercive political influence on the part of the center, or from other nations that may seek to dominate them such as the Soviet Union. In this way the stage will be set for international cooperation, cooperation in which the Latin American countries will be able to protect themselves from economic coercion such as boycotts or withheld loans, or from direct military interventions.
How might this occur? It is hard to say. The basis of our hope is that God will do a new thing for the sake of weaker nations and classes. We would suggest, however, that the Latin American nations establish an immediate political alliance, that they present a united front, and begin to carry out those actions that enhance their economic sovereignty. A first step would be a unified repudiation of their debt. This invites economic chaos, but it can be done gradually, pressure can be exerted since a repudiation of the debt threatens the center as well. This is an optimistic scenario. In actual practice things will probably be more messy. It is quite possible that the ideology of free trade will eventually work to the disadvantage of the center since the center's work force can scarcely compete with the lower wages of the periphery. Greater economic warfare and protectionism is a real possibility. Since a major obstacle to the political autonomy of Latin America is its economic dependence, a breakdown in world trade offers the possibility of breaking free politically. Or, it is possible that the periphery will become so pressed at home, that revolutions will occur, revolutions hostile to the center, and these will lead to breaks with the center. Or perhaps, between revolutions on one hand, and the recognition of common interests on the other, the Latin American nations will band together and defend themselves economically. It doesn't seem probable that Latin America will achieve greater political autonomy without at least running the risk if not actually experiencing a breakdown in its economic relations with the center. For the time being, those relations may need to be sacrificed in order to gain political autonomy. Once that autonomy is achieved, the advantages of world trade can be negotiated on a mutually beneficial basis. In any event, greater political autonomy is the first step.
Once the Latin American countries are able to defend themselves economically, or to negotiate as equals in matters of international trade, at least two things need to occur if world trade is to approximate present levels. First, peripheral countries need to be protected against the oscillations in world commodity prices, and this implies their regulation. Commodity prices need to be fixed at levels which will enable peripheral nations to receive equal living standards through the trade of their products for the center's exports. Secondly, and this is similar to the first requirement, the terms of trade between center and periphery need to be adjusted so that the rewards of labor are equal in both center and periphery. From the point of view of the covenant, the direction of economic and political transformation needs to go toward the weaker and poorer nations. Equality in the terms of trade is not an abstract law, if anything, the periphery should be given the advantage. Nevertheless, simple equality would be a great step in the right direction.
In light of the foregoing, we suggest that the church in the center, and particularly in the United States, support those efforts that seek to increase Latin America's political autonomy and economic advantage. The most viable option would be for the church to advocate minimal political interference by the United States in Latin American affairs. At the present moment United States interventions are justified by an anti-communist ideology. There is a point to this. The Soviet Union constitutes a threat, and a real threat. But there is a differences between Soviet control of Latin American countries, and efforts on the part of Latin American peoples to free themselves from an oppressive economic system. The United States is certainly powerful enough to compel any Latin American government not to allow itself to be used a Soviet missile or military base, or as a port for Soviet military vessels. Beyond those limitations, the peoples of Latin America should be allowed the freedom to work out their own economic and political destiny and this will include measures that counter the apparent economic interests of the United States. What the church must not do is allow itself to become a party to an anti- communist crusade whose real intent is to preserve North American assets and profits. Communism is a real evil. Under Lenin it took a form that allows the party to dominate the masses, and this implies economic dominance as well (2.3). The fact of dominance, the control of the wealth and political power, is not, however, unique to communism; it is characteristic of numerous Latin American dictatorships. If the church wishes to join an anti-communist crusade, a crusade that often fails to distinguish between communism and legitimate attempts to create a new order, then the church should advocate intervention against oligarchies of the right as well. As far as I know, the United States has never toppled a right-wing oligarchy, seized the estates of the upper classes, distributed the land, cancelled the foreign debt, and returned the productive system to the host country.(180) We could suggest that the church advocate interventions of this sort, if there were any chance that the United States would do such a thing. But it will not, its love of money is too great for it to be a revolutionary force. Therefore, we advocate allowing the people of Latin America the freedom to determine their own destiny, recognizing that they will probably adopt political and economic approaches that counter the economic interests of the United States.
We may now turn our attention to political changes within Latin America itself. We do not wish to comment at length. Our feeling is that these issues are Latin American issues, and that our best service is to press for policies that allow Latin Americans to sort out their own affairs. Nevertheless, we have advocated that Latin Americans repudiate their foreign debts and greatly curtail or regulate foreign ownership of their economic resources. These actions concern the center, and therefore come within our purview for comment. Further, however, we have suggested that they carry out agrarian reform and regulate or socially control their productive system. These changes make sense to us. They are, however, Latin American issues and we shall not press these issues too greatly, but will comment upon the general issue of social or private control of economic resources as the matter is relevant to all economic systems including that of the United States.
By (2.12) the earth is given by God to the whole of humanity. By creation, it "belongs" to everyone. By covenant, it may be apportioned out and controlled among various nations, classes, and individuals. In making these divisions, however, there is a direction of service, from the strong and the rich in behalf of the weak and poor. Private property is not a right of nature; it belongs, if anywhere, to the covenant. This "right" can and has been used to trample on people. Under capitalism, the "right" of private property grants the monied class the power to route a disproportionate share of the flow of goods and services to its benefit by utilizing the labor of others to its advantage. The only justification of private property as backed up by law and force, is to provide for the welfare of the whole of society with special reference to the dispossessed and powerless. When it functions as a form of oppression, it must be redistributed or socially controlled in ways that enhance life.(181) Furthermore, the center does not "own" the foreign debt of the periphery, the Latin American lands that are controlled by local or foreign interests are not "theirs" by some eternal right, or production consolidated in a few hands surrounded by millions of poorly paid workers is not "private property"; but all these assets are to be judged by the criterion springing from the covenant. A degree of "private property" may protect people from arbitrary confiscation by the state or other parties, but the uncontrolled exercise of this "right" to the detriment of the social order cannot be justified. Clearly, there are no external rules in this matter, things must be sorted out by time and place. There is, however, a direction of service, and it does not include the "right" of private property to the detriment of others.
Furthermore, the covenant indicates a preference for the form in which political and economic life is organized. Jesus Christ and the covenant communities as formed in grace are the norm and center for the state. Jesus Christ is the church's norm, yet its form is social, being given through the building up of its members as they act in concert according to their norm. Regardless of a state's norm, it members remotely reflect the church when they act as one through their cooperative and concerted efforts (4.4). This is not a Christian ideal that can be imposed on the state. How this works itself out concretely may vary considerably in the outer sphere of the nations, although the direction of the covenant gives preferences for social forms and the dispossessed. This certainly allows for social ownership of the means of production, but it doesn't of necessity imply social ownership. What it does imply is an inclination toward political forms in which the society decides and acts in concert. For example, a society may decide that its economic life is enhanced by a degree of private ownership for the sake of the potentially dispossessed, and it may couple this with a degree of state ownership. The critical matter here is that responsibility is a social matter. Economic life is not a matter of individuals pursuing their separate goals, but a matter of citizens working together to set their goals and carry them out. The basis of economic life is reconciled action between people. Simply proposing that the state direct or own the means of production does not create reconciliation. During and after World War II, for example, the state in Chile took a very active role in economic affairs by becoming a major shareholder in many Chilean enterprises. The rewards of state ownership, however, were appropriated by the politically dominant class working through the state apparatus.(182) In this case, the role of the state was to further the interest of the politically powerful. The problem is really a matter of reconciliation, of people working in concert to supply the necessities of life for everyone. We have not investigated what political forms best realize this goal for a given historical situation, and can go no further at this point.
Finally, with respect to Latin American internal affairs, we cannot expect real economic change to occur without political conflict and struggle.(183) Economic life has its basis in social history (2.3), and the terrible economic suffering in Latin America will not be changed apart from encounters between classes and nations, and these encounters will include violence. The outer sphere of the nations is not ruled by the gospel. It is ruled by force in the service of law, where lay is dynamically understood to remotely reflect the center of history, the passing of the old order and the formation of the new, (1.9) and (3.8). This revolutionary change will not occur without the formation of new laws that protect the interests of the dispossessed and jobless. Force will be applied as these laws are formed. Efforts will be made to break the power of those classes that permit foreign dependence and internal exploitation. When this occurs, when nations repudiate their debts or expropriate foreign or domestic holdings, the church needs to recognize that the decision for force is the prerogative of the people directly involved. The people of Latin America are aware of their situation, and they are the ones who will suffer the violence if force is employed. The opinions of those in the center, of those who do not suffer the economic deprivation and the physical violence, have far less weight. Furthermore, the church needs to proclaim the justice of a peripheral country's expropriating the center's assets, and it should refuse to apply a supposedly "Christian" ethic to the use of violence. It is hypocrisy to espouse non-violence under the present conditions. The center has long done violence to the periphery, and demanded economic sacrifices that the center itself was unwilling to suffer. Barth makes the following comment in reference to the "upper classes" who demand economic renunciations of the "lower classes," and then attempt to portray their revolt as a revolt against a divine order: "And where those who resist these demands are driven to rebellion, and take measures to improve their position and attain equality, it is a two-fold hypocrisy to try to denounce this as revolt against a divinely imposed renunciation. Where someone who is well fed himself tries to inflict hunger upon others, and makes out that it is their duty to suffer hunger, God takes the side of the hungry, and He and not they will be the first to see that they are satisfied."(184) In saying this we are not endorsing generalized violence. Violence is not of the nature of things, class warfare is not inevitable (2.12). One can easily imagine a mythology of revolutionary violence, and this certainly counters Barth's belief that the church "manifest a distinctive horror of war."(185) We are simply saying that our social historical analysis of Latin America leads us to believe that there will be legitimate attempts to reform the social order, and they will entail force. In general, we recommend that the church advocate non-interference in Latin American struggles, including those instances in which a country appropriates United States assets or repudiates its debts.
We may conclude with a comment on economic conditions within the center itself, particularly the United States. We have shown that the center's relations with the periphery reflect the sins of sloth, pride, and falsehood. The covenant has been broken, and the result has been the loss of Eden. This has occurred in the periphery, but it occurs and will continue to occur in the center as well. Sooner or later, the center will reap the bitter fruit of its breaking covenant with the periphery, and the result will be economic suffering (2.7). It is impossible to say how this will occur. It can be noted, however, that over the past few centuries the center with respect to Latin America has shifted from Spain, to England, to the United States. It is quite possible that the United States will become an economic backwater. Or, the United States pays a very heavy economic price for its military prowess, and this may break the economy in the long run. It is to be hoped that we are wrong in these pessimistic expectations. There is the hope that God's mercy will prevail. God acts in the nations as in the covenant, and there is both judgment and mercy in Jesus Christ, the one for the sake of the other. A way of escape may emerge. This escape will reflect the unmerited grace given to humanity in Jesus Christ. We cannot see how this will occur, but the church may well have the chance to be helpful in this process. The church's first responsibility is to repent and ask forgiveness for its own complicity in economic sin. At the ideological level, the church needs to refuse to believe the prevailing ideology, or to celebrate its values. It needs to formulate an empirical and theological understanding of how Mammon directs and dominates the social order, and from that perspective, what sorts of actions and legislation could counteract its power. We have sought to shed light on this matter by presenting a way of analyzing economic affairs from a theological perspective. Further discussion, together with specific efforts in the economic arena, are badly needed. By refusing to believe in the prevailing ideology, and by seeing and acting in a new light, the church may be of help to the whole of society. Finally, recalling the fact that the church is the inner circle with respect to the state (4.3), and that its life and law are a model for state law, the church also needs to reform its own economic life and practice. This is an important matter, and it implies living differently. We have not spoken of this in detail, but it can be only in the direction indicated by Barth when he closed an essay on poverty with these words: "One of St. Paul's sayings sums all this up: 'Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, although He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich.'"(186)
Endnotes to Chapter Five
1. Virtually the whole of the discussion on Barth's socialism has been theoretical and abstract, with little attention given to actual historical conditions. One of the strongest studies, for example, is that of Dannemann in his Theologie und Politik im Denken Karl Barths. It is an excellent study of the implications of Barth's Christology for the social order. Dannemann's goal is to describe how Christology, anthropology, and political praxis are related in the two Romerbrief and the Church Dogmatics, pp. 22-23). With respect to the Church Dogmatics, he understands Jesus Christ to be as the center of history, the crisis and hope of the social order (section two of chapter two). The radical transformation that occurred in Jesus Christ confronts unreconciled society as its crisis, and impinges upon society as a new reality bringing a new social order as its hope. Dannemann then describes capitalism, and here he follows Barth, as the manifestation of an unreconciled society (pp. 186-201). Dannemann describes the rule of capital, how human beings are significant only in so far as they serve the needs of capital, and how this produces alienation among employers and employees. The result is that the state reflects the rule of capital, and the capitalist state is characterized by class conflict and external war (pp. 188-90, 90-93, 94-97, 97-99). Then Dannemann describes a reconciled society, gives its characteristics, and concludes that Barth recognized social democracy as the social system displaying the greatest affinity with the reconciled society. "In Barth's view, democracy and socialism present an affinity to the reconciliation of the world with God and to a reconciled society, because its fundamental values (freedom--equality--brotherhood, that is, freedom--justice--solidarity) have an affinity to the divine goal of the reconciled history and to its corresponding human-political goal and purpose." (p. 215.) This analysis, and Dannemann reflects Barth at this point, is essentially non-historical. It uses adjectives to describe social realities, not verbs and events. Certainly historical examples could be supplied, but the discussion allows for the possibility of a general discussion of the pros and cons of capitalism versus socialism, and it does not direct attention to specific historical circumstances. The Word for Barth is concrete and historically specific, it is not a general discussion on various social programs. Therefore, we have not argued capitalism versus socialism, but rather, we are investigating an aspect of contemporary history. See also the article by R. E. Hood, for another example of grounding Barth's social ideas in Christology. Hood reaches conclusions that are similar to Dannemann's. R. E. Hood, "Karl Barth's Christological Basis for the State and Political Praxis," Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 33, pp. 236-237. The article by Dannemann, "Karl Barth und der religiose Sozialismus," gives a summary of the contents of his book. "Karl Barth und der religiose Sozialismus," Evangelische Theologie 37 (March-April 1977): 127-148.
2. Barth did not do what we are doing, and, according to Gollwitzer, this represents a failing on Barth's part. Gollwitzer notes that Barth read the Marxist theoreticians, but he did not incorporate their insights in any depth. He did not present an analysis that uncovered the governing principles of a given social system, and in light of that analysis, theologically appraise it. As a result, his political insights tended to be on a moral plane, rather than penetrating to the roots of things. "So his [Barth's] protests against Nazism, against the cold war, and against West German rearmament were to remain on a moral plane where they certainly also belonged, but where, however, they remained blind to the genuine causes as long as they were not supplemented by a recognition of the most powerful, counteracting social factors--which, of course were also to influence the church to which Barth particularly addressed himself." (Hunsinger, Karl Barth and Radical Politics, p. 103.) A similar point of view has been expressed by Charles West in his Communism and the Theologians. In West's view, Barth does not understand the scientific side of Marxism, he shows little grasp of economic problems, is unacquainted with Christian ethical thought in economic affairs, and though strong in philosophy and culture, he is weak in politics, economics, and the social sciences, (pp. 179, 186, 285, also, 314. See also Busch, pp. 14-15, where Barth's early scholastic aptitudes are mentioned, including a "fierce antipathy toward mathematics and the natural sciences," and a great love of history and essay writing.) Consequently, Barth "rushes into political and economic judgments armed only with theological insight and a limited experience, ignoring . . . the vast body of social scientific literature, some of it standard for Christian understanding in these fields, which might enlighten him as to the actual human situation he confronts." (p. 286.) We agree with Gollwitzer and West's assessment of Barth's weaknesses. It is not enough to object morally to certain abuses, or to recognize that the general characteristics of a system are at odds with the Christian faith. The aim of theology is to aid in proclamation, and proclamation deals with actual deeds, with judgment on human actions, and the proclamation of forgiveness and a call to new ways of living. Therefore, a social system must be analyzed historically, its governing powers disclosed and theologically appraised, and judged in terms of their manifestation in actual deeds by nations, classes, and persons. This implies a social historical analysis, and that will be the task of this chapter.
Furthermore, the concreteness of the Word, the fact of the Incarnation as an event in history, implies that theology has a natural ally in the social sciences. Bonino expresses our basic position. In his view the scriptural Word is not to be understood "as a conceptual communication but as a creative event, a history-making pronouncement. Its truth does not consist in some correspondence to an idea but in its efficacy in carrying out God's promise of fulfilling his judgment." (Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 89, also 134. See also, Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution, pp. 105-112.) In light of the fact that God's Word is a history-creating event, Bonino concludes that every Christian expression or action must be assessed for its relevance for history, with special reference to the poor and oppressed. (For this discussion see pp. 86-103 of Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, and pp. 31-8, of Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution.) Furthermore, there exists socio-economic disciplines by which to analyze the historical efficacy of certain courses of action, and these disciplines describe the relevance of social groups, their values, thought-forms, and behavior, for the society as a whole. These analyses can be applied to the church, to its theology and ecclesial action. These disciplines reveal how a particular ecclesial body, its theology, proclamation, and pastoral work, and its prophetic action or lack of it, actually function within its social and economic context at a given moment in history. Wittingly or unwittingly, theology and ecclesial life always have political and economic significance. This significance is the ideological content of a given theology or ecclesial action. It is how an ecclesial body actually functions in and affects society and history. Furthermore, God's Word is ideological. The Word creates and directs history, and impinges upon the social and economic aspects of historical existence. The prophetic Word, for example, is so "closely knit" to historical fact that it "becomes impossible to present the historical fact as a mere 'brute fact' or the prophetic interpretation as a general principle, unrelated to the situation from which it arose." (Bonino, Christ and the Younger Churches: Theological Contributions from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, p. 26.) Since God's Word creates history and transforms society, it is incumbent upon the hearers and doers of that Word to discern its concrete historical relevance. A sociological analysis helps to determine the actual relevance of certain theological or ecclesial positions. Without this analysis, faith and praxis remain unconscious of their historical significance, and run the risk of supporting powers and structures contrary to the gospel. Therefore, Bonino sees two mediations, a sense of the direction of the biblical texts, and a scientific analysis of reality to discern the concrete relevance of the biblical direction in history. (Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 103; Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution, pp. 114-5, 127.) Within the limits of this study, however, we cannot present a full-blown ideology. But we can present a fusion of our results with empirical reality, and thereby avoid a form of theological docetism. From a Barthian perspective, the concreteness of the Word demands it. Furthermore, making a decision to use a certain form of historical analysis, or deciding for a specific historical option, does not mean that theology has lost its critical function, or that we have given religious sanction to a given ideology or political program. Christologically, in Barth's view, the Word does not divinize the flesh by taking its form. (Church Dogmatics, IV:2, pp. 60-69.) Bonino expresses the matter in these words: "On the one hand, it is indeed necessary to reject as strongly as possible any sacralizing of ideology and system. . . . there must be no room for theocratic systems of any sort either from right or from left. But it is important to stress that such a secularization of politics is to be attained not through a new idealism of Christian theology, but through a clear and coherent recognition of historical, analytical, and ideological mediations. There is no divine politics or economics. But this means that we must resolutely use the best human politics and economics at our disposal." Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 149. See also p. 124.
3. Bonino cannot accept Marxism's underlying principles, though he can make use of aspects of its scientific analysis, and join with it in its hope for liberation. Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution, pp. 97-102.
4. Why have we chosen to analyze capitalism, and specifically our relations with Latin America with an emphasis on Chile? Doesn't the United States have more to fear from communism than from the inherent flaws of its own economic system? We could certainly adapt our analysis to communism. We could, for example, focus on the Soviet Union and consider its centralized economic system as an expression of its centralized political system (2.3). Certainly this would be an important area of study. From a Barthian perspective, however, the West, both its churches and its political order, has more to fear from God and his judgment on unrepentant sinners than from the communism although communism constitutes a very real threat. The church does not serve God or western society by confessing the sins of its enemies. The task of the church is to "teach, enlighten, rouse, set on the right path, comfort and lead to repentance and a new way of life." (Barth, Against the Stream, p. 117.) It cannot fulfill its divinely ordained task of leading people to repentance if it simply repeats the anti-communist rhetoric that passes for the whole truth in political affairs. It must, in Barth's words, go "against the stream." "I cannot admit that it is the duty of Christians or of the Church to give a theological backing to what every citizen can, with much shaking of his head, read in his daily paper and what is so admirably expressed by Mr. Truman and the Pope. . . . No, when the Church witnesses it moves in fear and trembling, not with the stream but against it." Against the Stream, p. 116.
5. Yoder makes an observation on the difference between Marxist and capitalist's views of reality, which may help explain why Marxist thinkers locate economic life in a social context. "The gospel is on the side of the poor; not because of Barth's especially weak analogy . . . but for deeper reasons expressed in what Jesus and the prophets say about mammon and about the orphan. The mystical or prophetic ideal behind Marxism is at this deep level Judeo-Christian, whereas that behind laissez-faire capitalism is enlightenment-humanist. Marxism has a biblical goal but wrong methods; Western individualism provides more tolerable methods (for those who are successful within it) but a wrong goal. (J.H. Yoder, Karl Barth and the Problem of War [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970], p. 129. For a similar observation, see Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p. 115.] Our study would lead to the conclusion that a socioeconomic system that provided a mechanism whereby all sectors of the society were given access to political power, as is the intent of democracy, would be stronger than a system in which power is concentrated in a few hands, although all sectors benefit from the economic system, as is the intent of communism. A viable economic life can be secured in a vital political order (2.3), but a secure economic life is not a sufficient condition for a humane political order (2.5).
6. David Horowitz, Marx and Modern Economics, (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968), p. 21.
7. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Marx's Critique of Political Economy begins by making the social nature of production the key to his approach, (Horowitz, pp. 21), and then (p. 23), he points out the historical character of these social relations.
8. Ibid., p. 14.
9. Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1974), p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as Capitalism.
10. Ibid., p. 5. Sweezy presents a very lucid account of Marx's economic theory in which he shows that Marx's aim in Das Capital was to study political economy, that is, economic reality as conditioned and shaped by social formations. See chapter II, pp. 23f, on the qualitative value problem, and especially, section 7, pp. 334-40, on the fetish character of commodities.
11. Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, trans. Brian Pearce (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 59. Note Amin's comments, pp. 5-7, as well as pp. 137, 183. See also Cardoso and Faletto's methodology, which they term historical-structural. Fernando E. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, trans. Majory Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. ix-xiv.
12. Amin, p. 5.
13. See Sweezy's discussion in Capitalism of Marx's historical approach, pp. 20-22, especially the concluding remark p. 22.
14. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. 141-2.
15. Ibid., chapter 5, especially the comments on 141-142. See also pp. 39-43 of Amin for his version of these events.
16. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 25, on why Japan is the exception.
17. Amin, p. 22.
18. See Amin's discussion of this matter, pp. 7-10. He criticizes W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth. According to Amin, Rostow proposes five stages through which all nations pass. These stages are defined in terms of the society itself--its level of savings--and not in terms of its historical relations with other societies. In this connection, the common parlance of "developed" and "underdeveloped," evokes images of internal developments within countries--living standards, industrial production, health, literacy, and housing. Nations can certainly be characterized this way, but it ignores the point that nations normally exist in relation to other nations, and that they are often profoundly shaped by these historical relationships. Further, the terms "underdeveloped" and "developed" convey the impression that the underdeveloped countries are now where the center once was, as if nations pass through certain stages of development apart from their relations with one another. The terms "center" and "periphery" are chosen to convey the sense of historical and social relatedness, and further, to indicate the character of that relation. From a Barthian perspective, nations like persons, are constituted through their social historical relationships. Bonino makes this point when he comments: "Development and underdevelopment are not two independent realities, nor two stages in a continuum but two mutually related processes: Latin American underdevelopment is the dark side of Northern development; Northern development is built on third-world underdevelopment. The basic categories for understanding our history are not development and underdevelopment but domination and dependence. This is the crux of the matter." Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 16, See also, pp. 24-28.
19. Our analysis of capitalism is based upon the premise that it belongs to the outer sphere of the nations, and therefore its governing ideology and practice reflects the sin and confusion that characterize this sphere. Bonino appraises capitalism as follows: "For, quite apart from whatever humane aspects it may have picked up in its later developments, the basic ethos of capitalism is definitely anti-Christian; it is the maximising of economic gain, the raising of man's grasping impulse, the idolising of the strong, the subordination of man to the economic production." Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution, p. 115.
20. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 22-23.
21. Paul A Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1966), pp. 9-10. See especially chapter two of Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 22-43, for an excellent discussion of economic surplus.
22. Sweezy, Capitalism, p. 59. See p. 23 where Sweezy describes Marx's starting point as commodity exchanges.
23. Ibid., p. 56. See also Amin, p. 139, where he states that the two preconditions of capitalism are the formation of a proletariat and the accumulation of money capital.
24. Amin, pp. 91. 25. Ibid., p. 22. 26. Ibid.
27. On the basis of his examination of the evidence, Jordan concludes that Marx thought an economic base was a necessary but not sufficient condition for holding real political power. A class must also be conscious of its role and aware of its objectives, and this often entails an ideological transformation. (Z.A. Jordan, Karl Marx: Economy, Class, and Social Revolution [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971], pp. 57-58.) In this connection Anibal Pinto claims that there is a "great contradiction" in Chilean society, in that its democratic social system is based upon a stagnant and dependent economic system. Anibal Cruz Pinto, Chile, un caso de desarrollo frustrado (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S. A., 1959), p. 11. (Hereinafter referred to as Desarrollo Frustrado.) By "dependent," Pinto means that the dynamics of Chile's economy lie outside the country, in the center, and therefore, political life is essentially unstable since Chile cannot control its own economic destiny, which by (2.5) implies it cannot control it social destiny as well. Pinto, writing in 1958 in a time of apparent democratic health, proved to be right. Chile, once one of Latin America's strongest democracies, became a dictatorship in 1973, and has remained one of Latin America's most entrenched dictatorships. Without the power to control one's economic destiny, "democracy" is meaningless. Segundo expresses the matter as follows: "But if the power of extranational wealth is so great that the major political decisions are made in the light of orientations coming from those countries which dominate the world market, then the right of voting democratically will not bring real democracy to a country no matter how often it is exercised." Evolution and Guilt, p. 40.
28. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 15. See the section entitled "Structure and Process: Reciprocal Determination," pp. 13-16, for how economic and social factors interact. This perspective differs from the stereotypical view which holds that Marxism reduces social life to economic affairs. There is some debate as to Marx's view on the relationships between economic, political, and ideological factors. See, for example, the section entitled "The Origins and Assumptions of Historical Materialism" in Jordan, pp. 30-39. Jordan's conclusion is that Marx allowed for the relative independence of a number of factors, although economic factors were of fundamental significance.
29. Amin, p. 138. Segundo notes that Marx and Engels recognized the interplay of a number of factors. Many of their descendants, however, practice a stultifying "orthodoxy." The Liberation of Theology, pp. 57-62.
30. Note Segundo's comments in this respect. Evolution and Guilt, pp. 97-101.
31. Amin, p. 26, and Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, the final chapter, entitled "The Steep Ascent" on the Marxist continuing hope of a world proletarian revolution.
32. Amin, pp. 39-40; Cardoso and Faletto, p. 23. See also Baran's discussion, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 136-144, for a description of the first two stages.
33. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 139.
34. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 30. Note also Tulio Halperin Donghi, Historia Contemporanea de America Latina (Madrid; Alianza Editorial, 1975), pp. 150-1.
35. Donghi, pp. 222-3.
36. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 15. 37. Ibid.
38. In terms of Latin America's relations with the center, we may observe two phases, its early domination by Spain, and then its integration into what Bonino calls "the Anglo-Saxon colonial and neocolonial expansion." (Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 14.) Corresponding to these two periods, Christianity entered Latin America in two historical movements, the conquest and colonization of the sixteenth century, and the modernization and neocolonization of the nineteenth century (p. 4). The first movement was composed of the traditionalists, whose religious vision functioned as the sacrilization of an oppressive social order. "It served as an ideology to cover and justify existing conditions. God in his Heaven, the king of Spain on his throne, the landlord in his residence: this was the 'order of things,' God's eternal and sacred order. Class structure and land ownership (and the forms of consciousness corresponding to them) are thus incorporated into the world of sacred representation." (p. 7.) The second historic movement was oriented toward Europe, it was liberal, progressive, Christian democratic, and it is, in terms of its political vision, liberal and developmental. The privileges of this order, "free press, free trade, education, politics,--all the 'achievements' of liberalism--were the privilege of the elite. For the growing Latin American masses, undernourishment, slavery, illiteracy, and later on forced migration, unemployment, exploitation, crowding, and finally repression when they claim their rights--these are the harvest of one century of 'liberal democracy.'" ( p. 15.) Finally, since World War I, the masses began to enter public life, and liberals and conservatives became more and more united around the defense of the capitalist order. At the same time, however, a third form of Christian commitment arose, a revolutionary Catholicism (pp. 4, 13). With respect to this third movement, see chapter three, "The Awakening of the Christian Conscience," pp. 38-58.
39. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 20. 40. Amin, p. 84.
41. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 79.
42. Ibid., pp. 58-9. 43. Amin, p. 102.
44. Nickolai Lenin, Imperialism The State and Revolution (New York: Vanguard Press, 1926), pp. 61-62.
45. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 6.
46. Paul Baran presents material from studies on the growth of war by Europeans since the 12th century. In general, the level of war never more than tripled from century to century; it even diminished slightly during the pause of inward capitalist development in the early nineteenth century. In the 20th century, however, the level of war increased by a multiple of 25, an extraordinary increase, and then only in the first half of the century. See the footnotes on pp. 6-7 of Baran's The Political Economy of Growth.
47. Donghi, chapter 5, pp. 280-335. 48. Ibid., p. 280.
49. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 64. Also, Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, pp. 28-29.
50. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 113. In recent years North American interventions have been justified as part of the struggle against communism in behalf of the peoples of Latin America. The oppressive nature of communism is readily apparent, yet coercive action on the part of the United States is of a piece with the imperial expansion of the European peoples and of people in general. The lust to accumulate began long before the advent of world communism, and will continue long after this movement is exhausted. As much as anything, the anti-communist appeal, the slogan of defending the "free world," is simply an ideology to disguise enduring human motives.
51. Amin, p. 159; Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 143-144, 174.
52. Amin, p. 150.
53. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 144-150. See footnote p. 151 where he lists sources describing similar effects in other countries.
54. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 39. See also, Donghi, pp. 147-9. Donghi places the beginning of England's commercial penetration of Latin America in the late eighteenth century.
55. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 35. Pinto reaches the conclusion, p. 40, that if a liberal class and robust manufacture had developed in Chile, then free trade would have been to Chile's advantage. It is not insignificant that, late in the nineteenth century, the North American bourgeois class had enough sense to protect itself against British imports. Their principle political organ, the Republican party, advocated the protection of America's industries which, at that time, could not compete against the British. See also, Donghi's comments, pp. 215-6.
56. Amin, pp. 148-9.
57. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 56. Donghi, p. 211.
58. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 84.
59. Anibal Cruz Pinto, Chile Hoy (Mexico City: Signo Veintiuno Editores S.A., 1970), p. 121.
60. Amin, p. 152-155.
61. See table 30, p. 142, of Pinto's Chile Hoy, for statistics on income distribution in Chile's agricultural sector. In Donghi's view, the primary victims of the neocolonial order were the rural masses. "The victims of the new order could be found above all in the rural sectors. We have already indicated that one of the prior elements of this phenomenon was the beginning of the expropriations of indian communities in the zones where they had managed to survive until the middle of the nineteenth century." (p. 218.)
62. Amin, pp. 152-3. Even as late as 1965, though agriculture in Chile accounted for 9 percent of production, it used 24.4 percent of the labor force. Rural unemployment at that time was 33 percent. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 116, 120. See also Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 150-1, where Pinto contrasts agricultural developments in Chile with those of the United States.
63. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 166. Amin, p. 154.
64. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 91. 65. Ibid., p. 169.
66. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 119-20. See the table p. 119 for land use.
67. Ibid., p. 124.
68. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, section 56, pp. 88-90.
69. Ibid., pp. 162-3.
70. Amin p. 85, 145. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 116. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 138-9.
71. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 156. See table 10, p. 156, where Pinto lists a number of imported agricultural products that could be produced locally.
72. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 120-1.
73. Amin, p. 155. In this view, unemployment and poverty are not due to overpopulation, but social and historical factors. See the discussion by Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 237-248. There isn't much correlation between population density and living standards. Some of the wealthiest countries in the world are highly populated.
74. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 169-70.
75. Amin, pp. 171-2. 76. Ibid., the discussion, pp. 170-80.
77. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 61. Donghi, pp. 212-3.
78. Cardoso and Faletto, pp. 61-66.
79. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 55. 80. Ibid., p. 56.
81. Ibid. 82. Ibid., p. 36.
83. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 190-4.
84. Cardoso and Faletto, pp. 69-73.
85. Amin, pp. 15-16. 86. Ibid., the discussion, pp. 286-90.
87. Ibid., pp. 289-90, for further examples.
88. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 180-3, Cardoso and Faletto, p. 71.
89. Amin, pp. 185-189. 90. Ibid., pp. 194-95.
91. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 181-82. Pinto does not give statistics on the percentage employed in services; from p. 181 it appears to be about one-third. Andre Gunder Frank estimates 60 percent. Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) p. 110. Pinto, Chile Hoy, gives roughly one-third as well. See chart pp. 56-57.
92. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 180-81. 93. Ibid., p. 181.
94. Ibid., p. 180.
95. Ibid., pp. 38-9. Donghi discusses these two groups in terms of liberal and conservative, pp. 332-6. See also Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 195, were he notes the convergence of these two classes throughout the periphery.
96. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 39. See also Cardoso and Faletto, p. 54; Frank, pp. 90-91; and Donghi, p. 215.
97. Rios Montt, 1850-60, also sought to tax mineral exports and then develop a national economy, but met with little success. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 21-22.
98. Ian Roxborough, Philip O'Brien, and Jackie Roddick, Chile: The State and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1977), p. 9. See also Frank, pp. 79-80, for Balmaceda's economic program; and Donghi, pp. 333-4.
99. Amin, "Distortion toward Export Activities," pp. 170-80.
100. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 26-27. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, p. 8; Frank, p. 62.
101. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 29. 102. Ibid., p. 46.
103. Ibid., p. 63. Donghi, p. 313, gives a slightly different version of these events.
104. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 103. 105. Ibid., pp. 112-13.
106. Ibid., p. 176. This decrease in dependence reflects growing industrialization which increased with the depression and the War.
107. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 77.
108. Cardoso and Faletto, pp. 76, 128-9.
109. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 115. 110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., section 84, pp. 131-134, and especially his conclusions, p. 134. Also, Donghi, pp. 394-400, for a description of political events after the crisis.
112. See the three periods suggested by Pinto and Knakal, with the final division occurring in 1955. Anibal Cruz Pinto and Jan Knakal, America Latina y el cambio en la economia mundial, (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1973), pp. 72-73. Hereinafter referred to as Cambio.
113. See table p. 117 of Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado.
114. See discussion pp. 152-158 of Pinto, Chile Hoy, including the table pp. 156-7. Donghi, pp. 359-365, summarizes the changes precipitated by the Depression, including a greater role for the state in economic affairs.
115. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 118.
116. Ibid., p. 156. Also, Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 129.
117. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 120-1. See also Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, p. 28.
118. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 194-97. 119. Ibid., p. 185.
120. Ibid., p. 198.
121. Ibid., pp. 187-89. See also Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 228, where he speaks of the periphery in general.
122. In Pinto's view the inflation is a product of political efforts by various classes to maintain their position, and the variations in the value of exports. See his discussion, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 135-8. See also, Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 166.
123. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, p. 57. 124. Ibid., p. 36.
125. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 82.
126. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 189, 193. See also Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, pp. 37 for figures on rapid increases of capital investment after World War Two, as well as table p. 52.
127. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 126. See comments p. 85 in Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, and the table p. 149, which gives the composition of Latin America's exports, roughly 85 percent being primary products, and 15 percent manufacture.
128. Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 187, and table, pp. 184-5.
129. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 82.
130. Approximately 166 firms controlled 80 percent of the investment outside of the United States in 1957. Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 196. See also Frank, p. 299, for similar statistics.
131. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, the section entitled "The 'foreignization' of the Peripheral Economy," pp. 81-86, and note the table p. 83.
132. Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 61. See especially the discussion pp. 103-106.
133. Ibid., p. 197.
134. Amin, pp. 17, 103, 120. See also Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 228-9.
135. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, pp. 174-75. 136. Ibid., pp. 78-9.
137. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 180-1.
138. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, p. 55. Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 159.
139. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, pp. 75-76. See, Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 23, for similar statistics.
140. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 126. See comments, p. 85, in Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, and the table p. 149, which gives the composition of Latin America's exports, roughly 85 percent being primary products, and 15 percent manufacture. We are limiting ourselves to the situation where foreign investment is directed toward internal consumption by the peripheral country. Foreign investment, such as in some of the Pacific Rim countries, can also be directed for export to the center. In this case, I see no immediate limit on the growth of industry in the periphery. Such industry will eventually encounter the fact that the center, in my view, will raise tariff walls (these are already quite significant), to prevent the center from receiving the same treatment meted out by the British to the periphery in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For the effects on a peripheral country of being the host of industry exporting to the center, see Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 178-184.
141. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 77. 142. Ibid., p. 87.
143. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 176-7.
144. Ibid., pp. 106-7. See also Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, p. 52.
145. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 90-91. See comments by Amin, p. 179; Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 87, on Latin America's "vicious circle of debt."
146. Beginning in 1950, the United Nations proclaimed a decade of development for Latin America. (Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 24-25.) According to the development model, Latin America's economic woes were the result of such factors as its backward state, lack of capital, technology, and planning. The development effort failed, and it did so because its model was nonhistorical and mechanistic, it failed to realize that Latin America is dynamically related to the center. Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, pp. 24-26. See Bonino's description of the effects of development in the case of Brazil, p. 28.
147. Frank, p. 109.
148. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 165.
149. Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 103.
150. Ibid., p. 171. See also Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 89.
151. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 40.
152. See Amin's general discussion of the periphery's economic domination, pp. 292-299, and Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 113-115. See also, preliminary conclusions, pp. 170-72, and final conclusions, pp. 208-9, of Pinto, Chile Hoy.
We have not discussed the cultural effects of the post-war integration. An extended quote from Bonino will have to suffice:
"Cultural penetration completes the picture. Mass media, owned in some cases by foreign concerns and dependent in all on international news agencies, film and record production, and many other elements, spread even to the far corners of the third world the values and ideology of the Northern countries. Anti-communist and pro-Western ideological indoctrination and a systematic hallowing of the 'Western capitalist style of life' pervade almost everything that the common man reads, listens to, or looks at every day. Massive propaganda of consumer goods shapes the tastes and creates artificial needs. The use of sports for mass consumption and lately legalized and propagandized gambling reinforce this culture of alienation. Through all these means critical awareness is killed, and a society which ought to be motivated for effort and solidarity is led to escape from reality and to develop the habits and concerns of a leisure- and consumption-oriented world.
"In the final analysis, the capitalist form of production as it functions in today's world creates in the dependent countries (perhaps not only in them) a form of human existence characterized by artificiality, selfishness, the inhuman and dehumanizing pursuit of success measured in terms of prestige and money, and the resignation of responsibility for the world and for one's neighbor. This last point is perhaps the most serious." Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, pp. 30-31.
153. Cardoso and Faletto, p. 128-30. 154. Ibid., pp. 166-7.
155. Ibid., pp. 194-5. See also, Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, pp. 28-9.
156. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, pp. 39-47.
157. Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdorff, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 32.
158. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, pp. 187-8, describes the close relationship between Chile's armed forces and the military. According to Sweezy and Magdorff, Chile had at that time the highest per-capita military aid of all the Latin American countries, one of the largest armed forces on the basis of population, and it was one of the principle beneficiaries of U.S. military training programs. This was the period of the Vietnam War, and the United States did not consider an invasion of Chile politically feasible. Consequently, the United States could safeguard its interests only by using the Chilean military. (Sweezy and Magdorff, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile, pp. 40-45.)
159. Amin, pp. 39, 87. Marx did not develop this critique himself.
160. Ibid., p. 87. 161. Ibid., p. 87. 162. Ibid., p. 84.
163. Ibid., p. 43.
164. Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, p. 78. See also discussion pp. 108-13 for terms of trade before and after the depression.
165. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 79. See discussion pp. 79-81 and table p. 80. Also, Donghi, p. 359.
166. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 179, footnote 28.
167. Amin, the discussion, pp. 57-59. 168. Ibid., p. 59.
169. See Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 175-78, where it is proposed that the financial relation, the reverse flow of capital, has become more significant than unequal exchange for describing Chile's external economic relations. For a brief summary of the history of primitive accumulation, see Amin, pp. 292-302.
170. Pinto, Chile Hoy, pp. 112-3. See also Frank, p. 99, were he concludes that a total of 9 billion has been expropriated by the center from Chile, and this is a greater sum than Chile's entire capital stock in 1964.
171. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, p. 38, see table p. 40.
172. Amin, pp. 43, 67-69, 119-121.
173. Pinto and Knakal, Cambio, pp. 116-7.
174. See the summary of U.N. statistics presented by Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, pp. 22-23. They present a terrible picture of the crushing economic misery that engulfs the Latin American peoples. We may quote Segundo at this point: "It is our feeling that today the affluent and developed countries, to cite just one example, have firmly decided not to let their yearnings for solidarity get out of control. They will not share their fortune and prosperity on an equal basis with others who are impoverished. Does the Christian have anything to say about this? Is he saying it? The Community Called Church, p. 59.
175. Segundo observes, "It is truly alarming to see the Latin American bishops as they have become socially aware, denouncing the ultimate effects and final victims of this misery, while they maintain a strange silence, after the words of the Holy See, on the basic structure and real agents of this situation: the international capitalist market and the industrialized countries." De la sociedad a la teologia, pp. 127-8.
176. Barth, The Christian Life, p. 224.
177. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV:3, second half, p. 780.
178. This needs to be seen in historical perspective. During the approximately 130 years that Latin America has experimented with peripheral capitalism, the United States has grown tremendously in population and still feeds her people, Europe has rebuilt her economy three times, Russia has done so twice, China has been able to feed and clothe its people, Japan has rebuilt twice and feeds its people, even with a population density far higher than that of Latin America. If, throughout this period, capitalism has benefited the people of Latin America, if there has been substantial progress in supplying the necessities of life, nutritious food, adequate health care and housing, education and cultural advantages, then the conditions of the past defy imagination. There has indeed been progress in such matters as gross national product. Industry has grown, minerals have been extracted, the land has produced, but this progress has not translated into meeting the necessities of life for many of the people. At any given moment, it may be possible to point to some particular nation that, because of an influx of new investment or the exploitation of a new commodity, is experiencing a minor boom. Lacking historical perspective, these will be seen as the normal blessings of free enterprise. So far, however, these economic miracles have failed to enable peripheral economies to "take off." "The growth of the periphery, complimentary to that of the center, tends to lose its relatively steady rhythm and to become jerky. The Third World becomes the scene of 'miracles' of rapid growth followed by 'blocking' and 'failures to take off.'" (Amin, p. 178.) From an historical perspective, no peripheral country that has been integrated into the capitalist world system, and remained tied to that system, has been able to develop adequately, in spite of the fact that many have had ample time to do so. (Amin, p. 302; Frank, p. 11; Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, chapter 5; Pinto, Desarrollo Frustrado, pp. 10-11.) Perhaps there are exceptions to this generalization, but they do not apply to Latin America, if development entails meeting the basic physical needs of the population.
179. What is the basis of our ethic at this point--the grace and power of God as an event within the outer sphere of the nations. For a comparison with a contrasting point of view, see the article by Joseph Bettis comparing Barth and Niebuhr. Bettis sums up his comparison of the two with these words: "If one accepts as Niebuhr did, the status quo as somehow ordained and the past experience of the race as somehow normative for the future, Blumhardt's genuine expectation for the radically new within the sphere of actual, historical politics appears irresponsible. But if one accepts, as Barth did, that this world is really God's creation and the sphere of his reconciliation and redemption, than this expectation becomes the basis for revolutionary social ethics." (Joseph Bettis,
"Theology and Politics: Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr on Social Ethics after Liberalism." Religion in Life [Spring 79, 53-62], p. 61.
180. Barth was very aware of the evils of communism, and the fact that the communists have dealt with the social problem with "very dirty and bloody hands and in a way that rightly shocks us . . . " (Against the Stream, p. 139.) He would not give, however an unequivocal Christian No to communism as long as the West was not "attempting a more humane but no less energetic solution to this problem [the social problem]. . . . as long as there is still a 'freedom' in the West to organise economic crises, a 'freedom' to dump our corn into the sea here whilst people are starving there, so long as these things can happen, we Christians, at any rate, must refuse to hurl an absolute No at the East." (p. 140. See also his discussion of communism in How I Changed My Mind, pp. 62-7.) The West has not proposed "energetic solutions" to the social problems of Latin America, solutions that involve the same sorts of military force against oligarchies as it is willing to apply against communism.
181. The Chilean constitution of 1923, which lasted until the fall of Allende, placed restrictions on property and assets, giving the state the right to appropriate them for the good of society under certain conditions. It also guaranteed a minimum standard of living. Roxborough, O'Brien, and Roddick, pp. 21-2. Also, Donghi, p. 335.
182. "In reality, what we are observing here is that monopolistic capitalism is using public resources to its own benefit, and this in an ever more obvious form." Pinto, Chile Hoy, p. 81. See discussion pp. 79-81 of Chile Hoy.
183. In Bonino's words: "What is the source of this strange blindness to the unmistakable lesson of history that no significant human group, empire, or class has voluntarily yielded power, that no change has taken place except through the pressure of those below or outside? There is no possibility of speaking a meaningful word to the working class and to dependent countries unless the facts underlying this contradiction are unmasked and overcome." Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 120. See also Christians and Marxists, p. 93.
184. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III:4, p. 347. In a similar vein, Bonino objects to using the doctrine of reconciliation as a means to impose a "Christian" pacifist ethic on the oppressed: "The ideological appropriation of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation by the liberal capitalist system in order to conceal the brutal fact of class and imperialist exploitation is one--if not the--major heresy of our time." Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, p. 121.
185. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III:4, p. 456
186. Barth, Against the Stream, p. 246.
The Rev. Robert J. Sanders, Ph.D.
1986.
Archbishop Eames, Evaluation and Critique
Barth - Economic Life and a History Chapter 5
Barth - Political Responsibility for Economic Life Chapter Four
Building Up the Ancient Ruins - A Response to the Present Crisis
Cranmer on Salvation - Introduction
How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God?
Infant Baptism and Confirmation
Introduction to Anglican Theology
Introduction to Anglican Theology - Anglicanism and Scripture
Introduction to Anglican Theology - Articles One Through Five
Introduction to Anglican Theology - Articles Six Through Twenty
Introduction to Anglican Theology - Articles Twenty-One Through Thirty-Nine
It's Not Just Sex, It's Everything - The Virginia Guidelines
Judgment Begins at the Household of God
Jung, the Faith, and the New World Order
Justification, The Reformers, and Rome
Nicea and the Invasion of Bishops in Other Dioceses
Preface to the 1549 Prayer Book
Prefaces and Offertory Sentences
Reason and Revelation in Hooker
Richard Hooker and Homosexuality - Introduction
Richard Hooker and the Archbishop's Address
Richard Hooker and the Puritans
Richard Hooker and Universal Salvation
The Anglican Formularies are not Enough
The Creeds and Biblical Interpretation
The Creeds and Biblical Interpretation Continued
The House of Bishop's Pastoral Study on Human Sexuality - Theological and Scientific Consideration
